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U.S. PROPERTY LAW: A REVISED VIEW
KAMAILE A.N. TUR AN*
INTRODUCTION
The individual’s sole dominion over a parcel of land—to the exclu-
sion of others in the community or the public at large—is a myth, despite
the prevalence of this view in conventional U.S. property law.1 In prac-
tice, the rights and obligations in any one parcel of land is a mixture of
individual, community, and public interests coexisting in that land. It is
the proportion of those interests, not the outright exclusion of any one
interest, that defines ownership.2
A revised view of property law, defined in this Article, recognizes
the proportionality of individual, community, and public interests coex-
isting in property. That proportionality, not the mythical “individual
rights,” governs the complex property regimes that have evolved in the
United States.
In Part I, the conventional view of property law fails when con-
trasted with real-world practice. The familiar metaphor in property law—
the “bundle of sticks” representing the collection of property entitlements
* Juris Doctor, University of Hawai‘i, William S. Richardson School of Law. Partner,
Jones Day. Former law clerk to Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Judge Richard R. Clifton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and Judge David A. Ezra of the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawai‘i.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the views of Jones
Day or any other affiliation.
1 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALEL.J.
601, 603 (1998) [hereinafter Rose, Canons of Property Talk] (explaining that “the notion
of property as exclusive dominion . . . is far from self-evident, and it was even less self-
evident when Blackstone wrote [those] lines”); compare WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2 (West Group 3rd ed. 2000) (endorsing a view of prop-
erty law which says, “That is property to which the following label can be attached. To
the world: Keep off unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen. Endorsed: The state.” (citation omitted)), with id. at 516 (noting
the individual’s sole dominion over land is not true today and was not true when Blackstone
formulated the principle).
2 As explained herein, the term “ownership” does not accurately portray the complex and
interrelated set of interests in land. This Article adopts this terminology, which will be
familiar to readers, for the sake of discussion.
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an owner may claim—describes the world as seen through the eyes of
individual private property owners.3 The metaphor largely ignores the
existence of communities or the broader public, thus reinforcing the
incorrect view that individual rights are distinct and without context in
the larger socio-political structure.
Property regimes that reflect mixed interests in land already exist
in the United States and throughout the world, despite the narrow view
about the necessity of individual private property. Approximately half
the world’s land is held communally, and even in property strictly demar-
cated as “private,” “public,” or “common,” all properties actually have
elements of individual, public, and community interests.4 Conventional
focus on individual private property stems from and reinforces an over-
simplified view of property law that is blind to the complex and sophisti-
cated approaches to property rights that have developed over millennia.
The revised view here explicitly accounts for the proportional interests
in land and allows property law to continue to evolve.
In Part II, the bundle of sticks metaphor gives way to a new
metaphor that represents the revised view of property law. The propor-
tionality inherent in this revised view then supports a range of mixed
property regimes that encompass the complex relationship between
persons, society, and the land. The property regimes vary according to
locality and type of land parcel at issue, whether residential condomin-
ium units, single-family homes, livestock grazing lands, community
gardens, or large-scale agriculture. In the context of arable land, prop-
erty regimes must reflect the proportionally high community and public
interests in land capable of producing agricultural products—that is, food
to sustain society.
In Part III, the revised view moves property theory forward to
meet the challenges of food security in the twenty-first century. Land (it
must be said) forms the basis of society’s food production. Under prevail-
ing Anglo-American property theory, private ownership of agricultural
land generally entails the right to grow and sell crops as one pleases,
without regard to how much arable land is available in the region, how
neighboring land has been used, or whether the surrounding community
has access to fresh food. Food supply chains lengthen, and crops are
increasingly grown for export rather than for local consumption, as
3 See Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based
Resource, 32 ENV’T L. 773, 774–99 (2002).
4 See infra Section I.B.3.
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farmers and food suppliers pursue national and international markets.
The community and public interests in agricultural land are largely
ignored from a legal and policy perspective. But in times of disaster and
food supply chain disruptions—World War I, World War II, and the
COVID-19 pandemic—access to a regional food supply is critical to not
only food security but also to municipal resiliency planning and national
security. Property regimes reflecting the revised view of property law will
correct existing vulnerabilities by accounting for the proportionality of
interests in these lands. In this way, food security serves as just one ex-
ample of how the revised view can assist in the necessary evolution of prop-
erty law to capture the individual-community-public interests in land.
I. A REVISED VIEW OF U.S. PROPERTY LAW: INDIVIDUAL,
COMMUNITY, AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
Despite its inaccuracy, the Blackstonian conception of the individ-
ual’s “sole and despotic dominion . . . over the external things of the world,
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”5
retains considerable influence over real property law in the Anglo-American
tradition. Its influence is evident even in property theory that supposedly
eschews the absolutist view of property ownership.6 Indeed, although the
conventional approach to property law now conceives of property as a set
of rights in something rather than complete possession of that thing, the
prevailing “bundle of sticks” metaphor reflects a narrow focus on individ-
ual rights harkening back to Blackstone.7
But an individual’s sole dominion over a piece of property is a myth
that is not representative of property as it has evolved in today’s world.8
In actuality, property in the United States and around the world is a
complex and sophisticated mix of individual, community, and public
interests in land.
5 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
6 See infra Section I.A.
7 See Duncan, supra note 3, at 789–90.
8 See Rose, Canons of Property Talk, supra note 1, at 631 (critiquing the notion of exclu-
sive dominion); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 516 (“These famous words by
Blackstone are not true today and were not true when written. Blackstone’s words have
to be understood in a special sense, referring to the pure concept of ‘property.’ Of course
he knew well, as we know today, that there are many legal limitations upon the actual
use and enjoyment of property rights in land.”).
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A. Property, Defined by Myth
“Property” is no easy thing to define.9 Property, or, more precisely,
rights in property, are reflective of a philosophy; they do not exist of
themselves.10 They are created—and then enforced—by society, based on
legislative enactments, judicial opinions, and custom, which reflect the
judgments and values of the society as a whole.11 This is especially true
of rights in real property—land.12
Land is unlike objects based entirely on a human construct, such
as contracts or intellectual property. Land exists whether or not there is
a population to lay claim to it. It exists independent of whatever legal
framework is constructed to govern behavior surrounding the land. So-
ciety overlays a legal apparatus identifying rights to use the land and
defining social relationships around that land. “Land” becomes “prop-
erty” when there is societal recognition that persons have a legal interest
or title in that land that is enforceable against others.13 Real property is
thus ultimately a relationship between persons, society, law, and the
land: the property regime.14
What, then, does it mean for an individual to “own property”? The
very phrase is a remnant of an outmoded idea stuck in the collective
consciousness from the days of Blackstone, when the concept of property
involved a single individual possessing in totality a tangible object.15
9 See, e.g., O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 459–64 (2004) (describing
various approaches to defining property); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?,
71 NOTRE DAMEL.REV. 329, 329–33 (1996) (discussing the role of property in the political
order and in relation to other constitutional rights); JOSEPH WILLIAMSINGER,INTRODUCTION
TO PROPERTY (2nd ed. 2005) (noting that there is “more disagreement about property law
than one might imagine” and that “the law of property is conflicted, controversial, and
interesting”); STOEBUCK &WHITMAN, supra note 1, at2 (“The institution of ‘private’ prop-
erty has, of course, been the subject of vigorous criticism in the Western world from very
early times.”).
10 See SINGER, supra note 9, at 2–19 (presenting overview of various theories of property
ownership).
11 See id. at 5–6 (discussing legal relations in the context of property). To put a finer point
on it, rights in property reflect the values of those who have influence to sway societal rules.
12 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 10–11 (distinguishing real property from
personal property).
13 See SINGER, supra note 9, at 5–6; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 2 (“ ‘[P]rop-
erty’ is comprised of legal relations between persons with respect to ‘things.’”).
14 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 9, at 2–19; ERIC T.FREYFOGLE &BRADLEY C.KARKKAINEN,
PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 1–2 (West 2012).
15 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *258.
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Property ownership has evolved to consist of a set of rights in
something.16 The tangible thing (here, land) is simply the object of the set
of rights one possesses in relation to others.17 Each property right there-
fore represents the “social relationship between a resource user and
other potential users, with respect to a particular object, place, or feature
of the land.”18
Within this paradigm of property as a collection of rights, the
“bundle of sticks” or “bundle of rights” is the prevailing metaphor to con-
ceive of and discuss rights in property—narrowly focused on the individ-
ual’s rights in property.19 In this paradigm, ownership is divided into
component parts. Each stick represents a right which, when viewed in
aggregate, represents the entirety of rights in land or, when disaggregated,
can be transferred or otherwise diminished individually on a one-by-one
basis.20 These rights include the right to enter the property, the right to
use the property, the right to exclude others from the property, the right
to derive income from that property, the right to alienate (sell or lease)
the property, and ultimately the right to transfer or destroy rights in
16 See, e.g., Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (“ ‘Property’ is more than just
the physical thing—the land, the bricks, the mortar—it is also the sum of all the rights
and powers incident to ownership of the physical thing.” (quoting Passailaigue v. United
States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963)).
17 See SINGER, supra note 9, at 15.
18 Dylan Oliver Malagrino, Applying Communal Theories to Urban Property: An Anthro-
pological Look at Using the Elaboration of Common Property Regimes to Reduce Social
Exclusion from Housing Markets, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 33, 42 (2009) (quoting Elinor
Ostrom & Edella Schlager, The Formation of Property Rights, in RIGHTS TO NATURE:ECO-
LOGICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT, 127–56 (1996)).
19 See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1936) (Cardozo, J.) (“The privi-
lege of use is only one attribute, among many, of the bundle of privileges that make up
property or ownership.”); SINGER, supra note 9, at 5–6; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note
1, at 6; DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW 1 (LexisNexis
1st ed. 2011) [hereinafter CALLIES,CONCISEINTRODUCTION]; Rose, Canons of Property Talk,
supra note 1, at 612; Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting
Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 347,
364–74 (1998); Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 869, 873–90 (2013); see generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory
of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005) (providing historical overview of various ap-
proaches to property, including the natural rights model, the contract model, the ownership
model, the labor theory model, and the bundle of sticks model, and advocating for a value
theory model of ownership).
Since at least as early as the 1930s, the image of the bundle of stick has dominated
the discussion about and adjudication of property rights. See Duncan, supra note 3, at
774–75 & n.1.
20 See Duncan, supra note 3, at 774.
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that property.21 Inherent in the term “owner” is the recognition that
property ownership is a matter of degree; ownership is not an absolute
right in property but is rather a “relative measure of one’s interest in
property[.]”22 The bundle concept thereby reflects that the right to real
property is really a collection of interests in a parcel of land, as distin-
guished from the absolute ownership model.23 And it encompasses the
idea that there are different ways that people can use or claim rights in
a single parcel of land or even in components of that parcel. This meta-
phor to signify the collection of rights that make up the various aspects
attendant to property “ownership” is sufficiently established in property
law that the U.S. Supreme Court has accepted its premise as a starting
point for its property jurisprudence.24
Despite its prevalence as the model for property rights, the bundle
of sticks metaphor is incomplete. Blackstone’s hyperfocus on the individ-
ual’s rights in property imbues the metaphor.25 The very concept of the
bundle of sticks suggests that the individual’s interest in the property is
entirely isolated from anything else; from other individuals, from the sur-
rounding community, and from public rules and regulations.26 Similarly,
21 Goldstein, supra note 19, at 375; SINGER, supra note 9, at 2; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN,
supra note 1, at 6; CALLIES,CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra note 19, at 1, 100–63; Thomas
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730–31 (1998). Property
law evolves in accordance with state-specific common law and legislative enactments, and
so is not uniform, but the enumerated rights here are universally recognized rights in
property. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“State law determines []
which sticks are in a person’s bundle.”); Goldstein, supra note 19, at 349–51.
22 Goldstein, supra note 19, at 383.
23 See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
24 See, e.g., Craft, 535 U.S. at 278 (“A common idiom describes property as a “bundle of
sticks”—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute
property.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (referencing “the
State’s power over[] the ‘bundle of rights’ that [citizens] acquire when they obtain title
to property”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (“As we have noted, this
right to exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176 (1979))).
25 See infra notes 26–35 and accompanying text.
26 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in
the owner’s bundle of property rights”); Craft, 535 U.S. at 283 (identifying the “most
essential property rights: the right to use the property, to receive income produced by it,
and to exclude others from it”); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393 (“As we have noted, this right to
exclude others is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property.’” (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 176, 179–80 (characterizing the right to exclude as “one of the most essential
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there is a tendency to equate the term “property” with “private prop-
erty.”27 This default assumption is so ingrained in property theory that
law school texts entitled simply “property” focus almost exclusively on the
legal rules attendant to individual, private property rights, with public
or community interests in property referenced—if at all—as a restriction
on individual rights rather than as part of the property regime itself.28
Under this model, for example, owners of single-family homes or
condominium units might consider themselves to be private owners of their
dwellings, notwithstanding their obligations to abide nuisance laws and
zoning ordinances and frontage setbacks imposed by the government or
to abide by covenants and common-element rules set by the collective gov-
ernance of the homeowners’ association.29 In this context, the proportion
of individual interest is relatively high when compared with the collec-
tive interest in this type of land use, and so the myth of purely individual
land ownership may appear innocuous. But in other contexts, where the
proportion of community and public interest in the land is higher, the
myth not only misleads, but also harms those broader interests.
Thus, the fundamental failure of the bundle of sticks metaphor is
that it encourages the misconception that property ownership is merely
a collection of individual rights, without any recognition of the obliga-
tions and broader public and community interests accompanying those
rights.30 It retains focus on the Blackstonian individual, and suggests—
incorrectly—that individual rights are disconnected from and can be
regarded separately from the rest.31 So although the bundle metaphor
recognizes that property rights can be disaggregated, each “stick” contin-
ues to represent an individual right that fails to encompass all the other
concomitant obligations and community-public interests. It thereby
sticks in the bundle of [property] rights,” and declaring that it is “universally held to be
a fundamental element of the property right”).
27 Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons, 5 INT’L J. OF THE
COMMONS 9, 11 (2011); see STOEBUCK &WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that “‘private’
property is the norm”); see also STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 25 (“Present
estates in land carry with them, as their single most salient characteristic, the present
right to exclusive possession of a particular parcel of land.”).
28 See, e.g., STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at xi–xii, 2–6, 224–40, 518–703 (holding
discussion of government land use controls until chapter 9 and limiting discussion of
community property to the marital property context); SINGER, supra note 9, at xi–xxiv
(presenting individual rights in property first and introducing public or community rights
as exceptions to an owner’s power to control property).
29 See infra Section I.B.1.
30 See Duncan, supra note 3, at 781; di Robilant, supra note 19, at 874; infra Section I.B.
31 See Duncan, supra note 3, at 782.
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encourages a disregard for community and public interests in land. A new
view, a new metaphor, is needed to accurately portray real property today.
B. The Actual, not Mythical, Nature of Property
As a social construct, property law has always evolved and been
open to experimentation, with more combinations of individual, commu-
nity, and public interests than is conventionally taught.32 From a holistic
view, property law moved beyond the “bundle” myth long ago.
There are three predominant categories of property under conven-
tional doctrine: private property, public property, and common property.33
They are typically presented as entirely distinct, defined in relation to
the rights (or lack thereof) of individuals.34 Broadly speaking, the under-
lying assumptions are that the individual owns private property, the
government owns public property, and no one owns common property.35
But the reality is more nuanced—the result of thousands of years
of human experiment in managing land and defining property. There is
instead a mix of public, community, and individual interests in any
particular parcel of land—regardless of its descriptor as public, common,
or private—depending on the land at issue and what right is sought to
be exercised on that land.36 Numerous examples from the Anglo-American
system and around the world evidence the intertwined systems of land
use that have evolved over time.37 In fact, the myth of pure individual
land ownership is not an inevitability, indeed has not really ever existed,
and need not form the basis of real property jurisprudence.
1. Private Property
Private property, as described above,38 is conventionally under-
stood in Anglo-American property law to refer to the collection of rights
32 See Jedidiah J. Kroncke, Disciplining Utopia: The Future of Cooperative Landholding,
49 ENV’T L. 453, 455–60 (2019).
33 Some scholars identify four property right regimes by conceiving of “common property”
separately from “open access” property. See, e.g., Malagrino, supra note 18, at 43. But as
discussed infra Section I.B.3, this Article treats “open access” land as unmanaged com-
mon property.
34 See Malagrino, supra note 18, at 43–44.
35 See id.
36 See infra Sections I.B.1–3.
37 See infra Sections I.B.1–3.
38 See supra Section I.A.
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that an “owner” has in something, represented by the bundle of sticks.39
When scholars discuss “private property,” there is usually an assumption
baked into that discussion: the property at issue is owned by a single
individual.40 So much so that when scholars distinguish between commu-
nal and private property, they do not bother to specify that when they
say “private,” they mean owned by one person.41 This default assumption
is a misleading oversimplification of the nature of property ownership.
There is nothing inherently “individual” about private ownership.
Take, for example, the single-family home, long the quintessential Ameri-
can dream. Even this ideal typically includes more than one person living
under that same roof. Many persons may share the same household re-
sources, especially in the case of multi-generational homes. To maintain
the myth of individual private ownership, therefore, property theory essen-
tially subsumed family members into one fictional individual.42 Expand-
ing outward, that family shares an interest in the general ambiance of
the neighborhood as well as the common elements or amenities that
community members may share.43 Even the market value of that single-
family home is based significantly on other costs or externalities born by
the community and the public, irrespective of the owner’s use, including
schools, surrounding properties, and the absence or presence of blight.44
39 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 9, at 2 (“Property concerns legal relations among people
regarding control and disposition of valued resources. . . . Because ownership concerns
a package of distinct entitlements, we should understand it as comprising a bundle of
rights.”); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (“ ‘[P]roperty’ is comprised of legal
relations between persons with respect to ‘things.’”); CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION,
supra note 19, at 1 (“Property as a legal concept consists of the rights that an owner has,
in relation to others, with respect to assets.”).
40 See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA.L.REV. 1889, 1890–92
(2005).
41 See generally Malagrino, supra note 18, at 46–47.
42 Peñalver, supra note 40, at 1929 (“[T]he freedom to act as one pleases, even within the
private confines of one’s home, is frequently overstated, particularly by those who fail to
recognize the communal nature of the household”). According to Peñalver, “theorists have
generally overemphasized the degree to which private property enables owners to escape
from communal coercion.” Id. at 1893. Instead, private property is “an institution that
binds individuals together into normative communities,” id. at 1972, and “actually serves
to facilitate ‘entrance’ into community by tying individuals into social groups,” id. at 1892.
43 See Barak Atiram, Between Racially Restrictive Covenants and Indian Beaver Hunting:
The Metatheory of Property Rights, 24 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 223, 246 (2019).
44 See id. As Atiram notes, “[a] significant portion of the value individuals attribute to
their land derives from collective characteristics which preservation accordingly demands
a concentrated collective effort. Similarly, the market value of the private home . . . is
influenced by the quality of the community in which it resides.” Id. “[T]he collective and
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These communal aspects to the property belie the very concept that the
“individual” is the baseline for private property ownership.45
More broadly, it is actually more difficult to envision private prop-
erty that is not owned or governed by groups. Many businesses, including
real estate firms, family owned restaurants, retail corporations, and law
firms—including the land they may own or lease—function under collec-
tive governance and ownership models despite their indisputably “pri-
vate” nature.46
Anglo-American property law typically addresses multi-owner
ownership of land through the concept of concurrent estates.47 And law
students will become familiar with the concepts of tenants in common,
tenancy by the entirety, life estates, estate of years, leasehold, remain-
ders, fee simple determinable, fee simple subject to condition subsequent,
executory interests, and so on—all to accommodate the myriad of interests
in property that vary from the individual fee simple owner template.48
Nevertheless, in the doctrine, concurrent estates (and all the rest) are
still treated as exceptions to the baseline individual owner, which does
not reflect reality but does reflect the conventional view of property.49
The rights attendant to private property in all its forms—either
individual or multi-owner ownership—are even further limited by coex-
isting public and community interests.50
The two most exalted rights in the individual bundle of sticks—
the rights to exclude and to use—are not absolute. The law recognizes
many limits on the rights to exclude and to use, to the benefit of the
community or the larger public,51 including the following:
private aspects of property usage are deeply intertwined, and so a richer and fuller
economic account must address the advantages of both private and collective control over
the community’s vital assets.” Id.
45 See generally id.
46 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 27, at 12–13; Malagrino, supra note 18, at 53.
47 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 9, at 352–53; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at
175–240; CALLIES,CONCISEINTRODUCTION,supra note 19, at 439, 491. See generally chapter
5 in STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1.
48 SINGER, supra note 9, at 304–17, 353–63. See generally chapters 2–4 in STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 1; CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra note 19, at 439–518.
49 See generally SINGER, supra note 9, at 304–17, 353–63.
50 See Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 867 (2014).
51 See generally Rose, Canons of Property Talk, supra note 1, at 603 (explaining that the
Blackstonian exclusive dominion over real property is a trope, not a reality); Malagrino,
supra note 18, at 52–58 (explaining communal strategies exist within even predominantly
privatized property regimes); CALLIES,CONCISE INTRODUCTION,supra note 19, at 105–46
(discussing limitations on the right to exclude); SINGER, supra note 9, at 24–40 (similar);
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• Custom, the public trust doctrine, or other back-
ground principles of state law may authorize right
of access for public recreation, hunting, or access to
waterways;52
• Antidiscrimination laws prohibit housing policies
that discriminate on the basis of race, sex, disabil-
ity, religion, or family status, among others;53
• The sovereign power of the state and the police
power of counties and municipalities authorize
government entities to enact rules restricting use
or access to promote the public welfare;54
• Zoning laws and environmental regulations restrict
certain conduct or require other conduct;55
• Courts have upheld non-owners’ rights to trespass
during emergencies or to exercise free speech rights
on private commercial property;56
• Owners may take land parcels subject to servitudes,
or may establish servitudes themselves, granting
non-possessory rights like easements to enter or
use the land;57
• Restrictive covenants or homeowners’ association
rules associated with subdivisions or condominiums
Carl J. Circo, Does Sustainability Require a New Theory of Property Rights?, 58 U. KAN. L.
REV. 91, 106, 150–51 (2009) (examining sustainability theory in the context of property the-
ory); Kelly, supra note 50, at 867–68(commenting that property law tends to overemphasize
the right to exclude).
52 See SINGER, supra note 9, at 86–91; FREYFOGLE & KARKKAINEN, supra note 14, at
369–96; CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra note 19, at 113–40.
53 See generally chapter 12 in SINGER, supra note 9; CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION,
supra note 19, at 581–610.
54 See CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra note 19, at 203–51; SINGER, supra note 9,
at 638; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 580–85.
55 See generally CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra note 19, at 203–334; chapter 13
in SINGER, supra note 9; chapter 9.B in STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1.
56 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72, 374 (N.J. 1971) (upholding an exception
to trespass for the health and safety of migrant farmworkers, while observing that
“[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited
by it.”); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (ruling that the
“exercise [of] state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center
property” did not “unreasonably impair the value or use of the [] property as a shopping
center”); SINGER, supra note 9, at 24–40, 76–85.
57 See generally chapter 5 in SINGER, supra note 9; CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION,
supra note 19, at 613–766; chapter 8.A in STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1.
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will limit individual use in order to protect neigh-
bors’ rights and property values;58
• The doctrine of adverse possession awards valid
title to non-owners following their open and adverse,
actual, and continuous possession of another’s land
for a certain specified statutory period;59
• Common law torts, particularly private and public
nuisance, limit uses that cause injury to the public
or to adjoining land owners;60 and
• Another less-glorified right in the bundle of sticks—
the right to lateral support—inherently recognizes
that land is connected, and limits one landowner’s
right to use his or her land in a way that deprives
an adjoining landowner of lateral support.61
Thus, “a landowner’s right to use his land inconsistently with the
public interest . . . is not part of his title to begin with.”62
The rights to sell, transfer, or even destroy rights in property are
also subject to limitation—either by rule of law or voluntary agreement.63
The common law rule against perpetuities, for example, limits persons
58 See generally chapter 6 in SINGER, supra note 9; CALLIES, CONCISE INTRODUCTION,
supra note 19, at 613–766; chapter 8.B in STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 469–514.
59 See generally chapter 4 in SINGER, supra note 9; CALLIES,CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra
note 19, at 147–59; FREYFOGLE & KARKKAINEN, supra note 14, at 634–76; STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 853–60.
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“A public nuisance is an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”); id. § 821D (“A
private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land.”); id. § 821A (discussing nuisance generally); see generally chapter 3
in SINGER, supra note 9; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §§ 86–91,
at 616–54 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing public and private nuisances as unreasonable
interference with uses in land).
61 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 817 (“One who withdraws the naturally necessary
lateral support of land in another’s possession or support that has been substituted for
the naturally necessary support, is subject to liability for a subsidence of the land of the
other that was naturally dependent upon the support withdrawn.”); SINGER, supra note 9,
at 135–36; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 419–21.
62 Duncan, supra note 3, at 796 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992)); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, AGRARIANISM AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 98 (2007) [hereinafter
FREYFOGLE,AGRARIANISM] (disputing “that private property includes the right to use the
land any way an owner wants, without regard for public implications” and observing “[t]his
is not an accurate statement of law or history, nor is it remotely good public policy”).
63 See SINGER, supra note 9, at 333–34.
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from transferring or otherwise exerting control over ownership of private
property for a certain period beyond the lives of those living when a deed
or will was executed.64
Other arrangements to restrict future use or disposition of the
property come in the form of restrictive covenants, easements, or other
land trust agreements.65 These mechanisms are used widely in the
agricultural or environmental context, with states across the country
managing waiting lists of landowners seeking to enter their property into
restrictive easements.66 Farmers and ranchers are increasingly pursuing
multiparty agreements with neighboring landowners, land trusts, and
the government to permanently restrict commercial sales of property—
“cows over condo” agreements to preserve farm and ranchland from
urban or retail development.67
Even a landowner’s very ability to enforce his or her interests in
property depends on recognition from the public (in the form of the gov-
ernment) and the surrounding community.68 Property is a social institu-
tion,69 and the entire concept of private property relies on a collective
agreement to acknowledge and, if necessary, enforce those rights, either by
the community or by the sovereign.70 Through these various mechanisms,
public and community interests encircle individual interests, providing
boundaries to and the foundation for the exercise of individual rights.71
64 See Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174, 176 (1883) (evaluating the terms of will against
the rule against perpetuities, “by which every devise or bequest is void which may by
possibility not take effect within a life or lives in being and 21 years afterwards”); CALLIES,
CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra note 19, at 476–91; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1,
at 118–38; SINGER, supra note 9, at 333–34.
65 See, e.g., Jennifer Oldham, Expanding Efforts to Keep “Cows over Condos” Are Protecting
Land Across the West, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na
tional/expanding-efforts-to-keep-cows-over-condos-are-protecting-land-across-the-west/2020
/04/10/96ec2f80-79c6-11ea-9bee-c5bf9d2e3288_story.html [https://perma.cc/4FD3-LUYN].
66 Id. See generally Malagrino, supra note 18, at 52–58 (describing mechanisms for collec-
tive management and preservation).
67 Oldham, supra note 65.
68 See Carol M. Rose, “Enough, and As Good” of What?, 81 NW.U.L.REV. 417, 438–39 (1987).
69 See supra Section I.A.
70 See Rose, supra note 68, at 438 (“In a sense, a regime of property is a gigantic com-
munal agreement not to succumb to the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’—the dilemma of a ‘game’
in which we are collectively better off by cooperation, but individually better off by ‘defec-
tion.’”); FREYFOGLE, AGRARIANISM, supra note 62, at 89 (“Private property is primarily
a form of power over people, not over land. . . . [T]his power is necessarily a public power
because it ultimately rests upon a landowner’s ability to call upon police, courts, and even
prisons to enforce his rights.”).
71 See Rose, supra note 68, at 438–39.
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Finally, the successful use of private property is influenced in no
small part by government acting through a variety of mechanisms. Gov-
ernment agencies act through grants, lending practices, and administra-
tive programs; they issue regulations governing or influencing mortgage
lending, fair housing policies, loan underwriting practices, foreclosure
policies, and farm equipment loans.72 Any number of government pro-
grams impact the success or failure of endeavors on private land. These
programs directly or indirectly influence what type of activities on land are
favored or protected and who is empowered to own or profit from land.73
This dynamic is particularly evident in the agricultural context.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) exemplifies the role state
and federal agencies play in the use of “private” land. The USDA was—and
is—directly involved in developing the agricultural system in the United
States.74 It quite literally enabled farmers to farm. Since its creation in
the 1860s and through the early 1900s, the agency devoted a substantial
portion of its budget to collecting and distributing seeds to farmers
around the country.75 These seeds were free and of good quality, resulting
in healthy crops for new farmers and homesteaders, and served as the
basis of seed breeding and experimentation.76 By one report, in the year
1910, over 60,000,000 packets of vegetable and flower seeds were sent
out across the country, including seeds for important cash and food crops
like sorghum, rice, wheat, oat, and barley.77
The USDA and other government agencies continue to play a core
role in the nation’s agricultural system and farming policies. The USDA
has initiated a “microloan program” to assist small and mid-sized farm-
ers to access loans, with the goal of providing “new opportunities for
American agriculture across the country.”78 The Farm to School Program
72 See Small and Mid-Sized Farmer Resources, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.usda.gov
/topics/farming/resources-small-and-mid-sized-farmers [https://perma.cc/MP5X-P6DX]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
73 See also infra Section I.B.2 (discussing private interests in public property).
74 See generally U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 72.
75 DEBBIE BARKER, HISTORY OF SEED IN THE U.S.: THE UNTOLD AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
CTR. FOR FOODSAFETY 2 (Aug. 2012), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-report
-for-print-final_25743.pdf [https://perma.cc/456Y-8YDH].
76 Debbie Barker, The Untold American Revolution: Seed in the United States, in SEED
SOVEREIGNTY, FOOD SECURITY 187 (Vandana Shiva ed., 2016); see also BARKER, supra
note 75, at 2.
77 A. J. Pieters, Seed Distribution by the United States Department of Agriculture, 13 PLANT
WORLD 292, 292–96 (Dec. 1910).
78 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 72.
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is geared toward linking small and mid-sized farmers with school dis-
tricts to encourage crop diversity, community food systems, and financial
stability for farmers.79 These types of government actions, among others,
directly and indirectly impact the nation’s ability to feed itself by effec-
tive use of arable land.80
Unfortunately, not all actions by the USDA were as universally
well-regarded as the seed distribution or microloan programs. The USDA
has been called the “last plantation” due to rampant discriminatory
lending practices that resulted in the rapid decline of African-American
farmers in the Reconstruction Era and beyond.81 Disparities persist
today, with highly publicized audits and investigations revealing that the
USDA granted women and minority farmers less credit than was granted
white male farmers, resulting in disproportionate presence in the agri-
cultural business.82 The USDA also historically did not, as a matter of
policy, recognize “heirs’ property” owners as eligible for loans to purchase
livestock or to cover the cost of planting; and given the disproportionate
percentage of Black farmers who inherited their land as heirs’ property,
this had a devastating impact on those farmers’ abilities to maintain
farms over many generations.83
79 See Community Food Systems, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://
www.fns.usda.gov/cfs [https://perma.cc/T5U9-ULVS] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
80 See infra Part III.
81 Seth L. Ellis, Disestablishing “The Last Plantation”: The Need for Accountability in the
United States Department of Agriculture, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 93 (2008) (documenting
discrimination by the USDA towards black farmers); John Francis Ficara & Juan Williams,
Black Farmers in America, NPR (Feb. 22, 2005), https://www.npr.org/2005/02/22/5228987
/black-farmers-inamerica [https://perma.cc/7LTF-D9NE] (describing discrimination at the
USDA, limited resources available to Black farmers, and resulting decline in number of
Black-owned farms).
82 Vann R. Newkirk II, The Great Land Robbery, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/09/this-land-was-our-land/594742/ [https://perma
.cc/5STX-Z5EQ].
83 Lizzie Presser, Their Family Bought Land One Generation After Slavery. The Reels
Brothers Spent Eight Years in Jail for Refusing to Leave it, PROPUBLICA (July 15, 2019),
https://features.propublica.org/black-land-loss/heirs-property-rights-why-black-families
-lose-land-south/ [https://perma.cc/TV9X-7F9T]. It is estimated that between 1910 and
1997, African Americans lost about ninety percent of their farmland. Id.; see also Newkirk,
supra note 82; see also Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Under-
mining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition
Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2001) (discussing black land acquisi-
tion and black land loss, with “the number of black farmers and the number of rural acres
under black ownership currently [] at the lowest point since 1900”); Thomas W. Mitchell,
Reforming Property Law to Address Devastating Land Loss, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014)
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So, government policies directly enable—or obstruct—the cultiva-
tion of the purportedly “individual” interest in a piece of agricultural land.
These many exceptions to individual private property ownership
engulf the mythical “individual” rule. The bundle of sticks concept depicts
a misleadingly narrow view of the rights and obligations concomitant
with property ownership. Private property is really a mix of individual,
community, and public interests and obligations. A revised view should
account for that mixed nature of property and allow for robust property
regimes suited to twenty-first century concerns.
2. Public Property
As with the private property category, discussions about public
property tend to be oversimplified. Public land is best described as
belonging to all, held in trust and controlled by the government, with no
one having any rights distinct from anyone else. Examples include
national parks, state hiking trails, local parks, sidewalks, and the like.84
But there are many examples demonstrating that community and indi-
vidual interests are intertwined in public land.
One example of this mixed interest is the extent of private com-
mercial conduct on public land. Private enterprise on public domain
lands administered by federal or state agencies is widespread, with
private entities obtaining rights in public land in the form of permits or
leases.85 The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 as amended, for example,
authorizes leasing of public lands such as those managed by the U.S.
(reviewing the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act); Faison v. Faison, 811 S.E.2d 431
(Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (discussing various states’ adoption of the Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act and remanding to the trial court for an initial determination whether the
disputed property was heirs property).
This disparity in lending practices is representative of other societal disparities. Not
everyone in society has enjoyed equal entry into the prevailing property regime, for in-
stance, whether by explicit exclusion in the form of restrictive covenants or indirectly by
socio-economic forces or other less obvious discriminatory market practices.
84 See Ray Rasker, Public Land Ownership in the United States, HEADWATERS ECON.
(June 17, 2019), https://headwaterseconomics.org/public-lands/protected-lands/public
-land-ownership-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/66T2-23KU].
85 CHARLES S. JAMES, HAW. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, PUBLIC LAND POLICIES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE MAINLAND STATES, REP’T NO. 5, at ii, 6–7, 34, 42–47 (1961) (de-
scribing, among other mechanisms, grazing licenses, permits for mineral extraction of public
domain land, and land use leases short of fee simple ownership), https://library.card
hawaii.org/cgi-bin/koha/opac-retrieve-file.pl?id=347bec01c81706ef6a8cd114f149d289
[https://perma.cc/3NBE-QU53].
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Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), for devel-
oping deposits of coal, petroleum and natural gas.86 Private corporations
pay a royalty in the oil and gas extracted from public lands to the United
States and may turn a profit on the remaining resources extracted from
public land.87 A number of states, including Texas,88 New Mexico,89 North
Dakota,90 Wyoming,91 Utah,92 Montana,93 and Colorado,94 among others,
authorize similar arrangements with oil and gas corporations on public
lands. North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Division mission statement provides
an apt description of the endeavor:
Our mission is to encourage and promote the development,
production, and utilization of oil and gas in the state in
such a manner as will prevent waste, maximize economic
recovery, and fully protect the correlative rights of all
owners to the end that the landowners, the royalty owners,
the producers, and the general public realize the greatest
possible good from these vital natural resources.95
Lands open to private enterprise represent a significant portion
of many public lands. In Wyoming, for instance, approximately one-third
of the 3.9 million acres of state trust lands are leased for oil and gas.96
And although the public and surrounding community may have an in-
terest in having access to these natural resources either to provide energy
86 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. Regulations are found at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3000, 3100.
87 30 U.S.C. § 192; 43 C.F.R. pts. 3103.1–.4.
88 Announcements, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. ENERGY BUS., https://www.glo.texas.gov/energy
-business/index.html [https://perma.cc/94MA-XE78] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
89 Lease Information, N.M.STATELANDOFF., https://www.nmstatelands.org/divisions/oil-gas
-and-minerals/lease-information/ [https://perma.cc/GU3D-8DM5] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
90 Homepage, N.D.OIL&GASDIV., https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/ [https://perma.cc/65JQ
-TZQW] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
91 Oil & Gas Leases, WYO. OFF. OF STATE LANDS & INVS., https://lands.wyo.gov/trust-land
-management/mineral-leasing/oil-gas-leases [https://perma.cc/3Z5C-LCKW] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020).
92 Oil & Gas, UTAHTR.LANDSADMIN.,https://trustlands.utah.gov/business-groups/oil-gas/
[https://perma.cc/3LY6-ZD8P] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
93 Oil & Gas Leasing Info., MONT.DEP’T OF NAT.RES.&CONSERVATION, http://dnrc.mt.gov
/divisions/trust/minerals-management/oil-and-gas-leasing-information [https://perma.cc
/8CKU-FNLC] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
94 Oil & Gas, COLO. STATE LAND BD., https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/statelandboard/oil
-gas [https://perma.cc/5ZBZ-X54M] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
95 N.D. OIL & GAS DIV., supra note 90.
96 WYO. OFF. OF STATE LANDS & INVS., supra note 91.
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to consumers or funds (in the forms of royalties) to the government coffers,
private interest in the activity is significant: According to the U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration, the net income for 43 U.S. oil produc-
ers amounted to nearly $30 billion in 2018 alone.97
These private interests in public property may lead to conflict
between other individuals or community groups. For instance, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently adjudicated a dispute between non-profit organi-
zations and two federal agencies, the U.S. Forest Service and the National
Park Service over whether Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, was entitled to
a special use permit that would allow construction of a natural gas pipe-
line stretching over 600 miles from West Virginia to North Carolina.98 In
upholding the special use permit, the Court evaluated the competing
authorities of the Park and Forest Services across the Appalachian Trail,
right-of-way easements, and the non-profit organizations’ argument that
the permit violated the Mineral Leasing Act.99 This lawsuit, and the
many others like it, demonstrate that public land management does not
happen in a vacuum isolated from private and community interests.
Grazing allotments also draw on these interests. The BLM adminis-
ters grazing allotments through permit or lease, authorizing individuals
or corporate entities to graze their livestock on public land.100 The com-
bined acreage of federal land regulated by the BLM open to grazing permits
or leases exceeds 150 million acres.101 Ranchers hold nearly 18,000 re-
newable permits and leases to graze cattle and sheep and other livestock
on these lands.102 In public lands within California alone, the BLM
administers approximately 665 allotments utilized by over 500 grazing
permits or leases, encompassing over 6 million acres of land.103 Even
97 Jeff Barron, 2018 was Likely the Most Profitable Year for U.S. Oil Producers Since 2013,
U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN. (May 10, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php
?id=39413 [https://perma.cc/RA3S-YSRU] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
98 U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1837
(2020).
99 Id. at 1841–42 (upholding permit).
100 Rangelands and Grazing, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://
www.blm.gov/programs/natural-resources/rangelands-and-grazing/livestock-grazing
[https://perma.cc/7VJM-C7RE] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
101 See id.
102 Id.; see also Rangeland Health, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/natural-resources/rangelands-and-grazing/rangeland
-health [https://perma.cc/B3FD-YZPJ] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (providing links to esti-
mated acreage in each state).
103 See California Rangeland Management and Grazing, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF LANDMGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/natural-resources/rangeland-and
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more land under state jurisdiction is put to private use, melding livestock
production, and land management and conservation.104 Private individuals
or corporations thereby benefit from the use of significantly more acreage
than any one private entity would otherwise own in fee or access through
private lease.105 Communities may then indirectly benefit from these
private-public arrangements by increased access to locally sourced food.
Yet another version of this public-private mix comes in the form
of so-called privately owned public spaces.106 In these spaces, government
entities require private developers to provide for public spaces, open to
either the nearby community or the general public, in exchange for
zoning variances or other preferential development rulings.107
Another type of mixed management system involves individuals
and community groups in the maintenance and management of public
lands through volunteer service programs. At federal and state levels,
volunteers may participate in a wide range of projects such as commu-
nity outreach, educational programs, or trail maintenance.108 Volunteers
may also assist with management by participating in research and
education programs, including trail use surveys,109 fire monitoring,110 and
-grazing/rangeland-health/california [https://perma.cc/7ZAQ-RQT6] (last visited Nov. 24,
2020); see generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 et seq. (from the Taylor Grazing Act of 1935); 43 C.F.R.
pt. 4100 (BLM grazing regulations).
104 See, e.g., Conservation Grazing, WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., https://dnr.wi.gov/topic/lands
/grazing.html [https://perma.cc/GFY2-GC9V] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (Wisconsin state
land management areas); Grazing & Agricultural Leases, WYO. OFF. OF STATE LANDS &
INVS., https://lands.wyo.gov/trust-land-management/surface-leasing/grazing-agricultural
-leases [https://perma.cc/Y8VT-986C] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (grazing and agricul-
tural leases for grazing livestock, raising crops, and other agricultural uses).
105 Neil R. Rimbey et al., Economic Considerations of Livestock Grazing on Public Lands
in the United States of America, 5 ANIMAL FRONTIERS 32, 32–35 (Oct. 2015), https://aca
demic.oup.com/af/article/5/4/32/4638743 [https://perma.cc/9E3Z-G2TY].
106 See, e.g., New York City’s Privately Owned Public Spaces: Overview, NYCPLAN. (Sept. 30),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/pops/pops.page [https://perma.cc/J6RQ-N2D2].
107 See Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 178 (2008).
108 See, e.g., Volunteer with Us, NAT’LPARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/getinvolved/volun
teer.htm [https://perma.cc/HD2A-6Y25] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020); Volunteer Opportunities,
WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., https://dnr.wi.gov/topic/parks/volunteer.html [https://perma.cc
/3MFB-QL63] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (Wisconsin State Parks volunteers).
109 See, e.g., Outdoor Recreation, STATE OF HAW.,DIV.FORESTRY &WILDLIFE (Jan. 13, 2019),
https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/recreation/ [https://perma.cc/5ULM-FC2V] (use surveys in Hawai‘i
parks and trails).
110 See, e.g., Fire Lookout Volunteers Needed, USDA,FOREST SERV. (May 16, 2005), https://
www.fs.usda.gov/detail/angeles/news-events/?cid=FSBDEV3_020375 [https://perma.cc
/THF5-23VU] (fire lookout volunteers in California).
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hunter awareness trainings.111 These mixed arrangements also exist at
the local level.112
In the urban setting, perhaps the most prominent example of
mixed management regimes in public lands are the community gardens
in New York City.113 In these community farm arrangements, land that
is owned by a government entity (usually a city or county) will be leased
to a local group of users, usually geographically close to the plot of land.114
The arrangement might be an informal agreement with a group of com-
munity residents who come together to improve a vacant or blighted lot,
or it might be a more formal structure with a nonprofit organization, com-
munity land trust, or community development corporation.115 Community
gardens, farms, and parks, have emerged in marginalized neighborhoods
that otherwise lack access to fresh food,116 and they are increasingly
prevalent across the country as concerns about food security and access
to fresh produce in the face of supply chain limitations have caught
public attention.117
The rural environment affords opportunities for mixed property
regimes with larger agricultural acreage. In the State of Hawai‘i,118 for
example, the Hawai‘i Community Development Authority (“HCDA”) is
a public entity whose goal is to “establish community development plans
in community development districts; determine community development
programs; and cooperate with private enterprise and the various compo-
nents of federal, state, and county governments to bring community
111 See, e.g., Hunter Education Program, Volunteer,STATE OF HAW.,DEP’TLAND&NAT.RES.,
https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/programs/huntered6/volunteer/ [https://perma.cc/5JFB-7KXH] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2020) (hunter education programs in Hawai‘i); Teaching Hunter Education,
N.Y. DEP’T ENV’T CONSERVATION, https://www.dec.ny.gov/outdoor/9189.html [https://
perma.cc/F79N-9Z58] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
112 In New York City, for example, there are thousands of advocacy, business, and “friends
of” groups that dedicate time, energy, and money to maintain public parks, open spaces,
and playgrounds. Lehavi, supra note 107, at 180–92.
113 See id. at 173–95.
114 Id. at 174.
115 Id. at 174; see also James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts That Conserve Communities, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 83–84 (2009) (discussing community land trusts to establish gardens
in previously vacant lots in New York, Maryland, and Massachusetts).
116 Amy Laura Cahn & Paula Z. Segal, You Can’t Common What You Can’t See: Towards
a Restorative Polycentrism in the Governance of Our Cities, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195,
196–205 (2016).
117 See infra Part III.
118 This Article uses appropriate diacritical marks for Hawaiian words except in certain
titles or quotations where Hawaiian words appear as originally written.
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development plans to fruition.”119 HCDA leases hundreds of acres of arable
land to non-profit organizations to enhance and encourage community-
based agricultural activities.120 There is increasing interest around the
country for similar collaborative programs involving farmers, municipali-
ties, and land trust organizations to offset regional farmland loss by
leasing land to farmers or placing easements on properties to preserve
them in perpetuity.121
The arrangements identified above are essentially voluntary, and
their prevalence reflects the broader societal structure in which property
rights in land exist and the extent to which individual or community
interests coexist in what is considered public land. Of a less voluntary
nature, the government is also directly involved in the conversion of pri-
vate lands through eminent domain.122 Short of outright expropriation,
the government might limit an owner’s use or possession of real property
through physical impediment or regulation for public purposes.123
Finally, any evaluation of rights in property must consider the
role the government plays in converting certain public lands to private
119 Aloha from HCDA!, HAW.DEP’T OF BUS.,ECON.DEV.&TOURISM,HAW.CMTY.DEV.AUTH.,
https://dbedt.hawaii.gov/hcda/ [https://perma.cc/ZUM3-RF4B] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
120 Discover HEEIA, HAW.DEP’T OF BUS.,ECON.DEV.&TOURISM,HAW.CMTY.DEV.AUTH.,
http://dbedt.hawaii.gov/hcda/discover-heeia/ [https://perma.cc/RZ2N-QKLL] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020).
121 See, e.g., Working Farms, TR.PUB.LANDS, https://www.tpl.org/our-work/working-farms
[https://perma.cc/XT8L-L535] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (“The Trust for Public Land helps
municipalities and other local partners conserve farmland under pressure or directly threat-
ened with development.”); LAND FOR GOOD,LEASING LAND TO FARMERS:AHANDBOOK FOR
NEW ENGLAND LAND TRUSTS, MUNICIPALITIES AND INSTITUTIONS (2012), https://landfor
good.org/wp-content/uploads/LFG-Leasing-Land-To-Farmers-For-Land-Trusts-Municipali
ties-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5LZ-JCPA]; CAL. FARMLAND TR., https://www.ca
farmtrust.org/ [https://perma.cc/96UQ-LU7L] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (assisting California
farmers preserve farmland); Where We Work, AM. FARMLAND TR., https://farmland.org
/where-we-work/ [https://perma.cc/4N55-TT7G] (same, in the Mid-Atlantic Region, the Mid-
west, New England, New York, California, the Pacific Northwest); WIS. LANDMARK CON-
SERVANCY, https://www.landmarkwi.org/ [https://perma.cc/9P3K-5NHY] (last visited Nov. 24,
2020) (same, Wisconsin); About, TEX. AGRIC. LAND TR., https://www.txaglandtrust.org
/about/ [https://perma.cc/VH6N-5UMH] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (same, Texas); see also
FARMLAND INFO. CTR., http://farmlandinfo.org/ [https://perma.cc/6RQE-MJ65] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020) (reporting on conversion of farmland to uses that compromise agriculture).
122 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that municipality’s
exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of economic development plan satisfied
constitutional “public use” requirement).
123 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (permanent physical presence constitutes a taking);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (expounding a regula-
tory takings analysis).
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ownership. Historically, the United States transferred public domain
lands into private hands in astonishing amounts by today’s terms, often
with little to no cost to the individual owner.124 From the mid-1800s to
the early 1900s, by one estimate, the federal government transferred
over one billion acres of land in the form of: land grants to individuals,
cash sales, awards for military service, grants to educational institutions,
and grants to railroad corporations.125 Through the Homestead Act alone,
the federal government distributed 270,000,000 acres of land to individ-
uals—ten percent of the land in the country.126 In this way the legislative
and executive branches, with the support of the judicial branch to uphold
these actions, are directly involved in creating private property rights
through land sale, homestead acts, leases, and grants.127 Homesteading,
in particular, was a key factor in creating the agricultural population in
the United States.128 In this way, government action forms the founda-
tion of individual interests in property.
The history of private property ownership in the United States is
thus heavily influenced by government decisions about who is deserving
of or entitled to private ownership over land previously held by the gov-
ernment. These actions reflect the policy priorities of the government
concerning the preferable uses or allocations of land. Scholarship on the
nature of private property ownership is remiss if it does not acknowledge
this dynamic.129 Any theory that seeks to define property through purely
124 PUBLIC LANDS FOUNDATION, AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS: ORIGIN, HISTORY, FUTURE 4, 6
(2014), https://publicland.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/150359_Public_Lands_Docu
ment_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B94F-XMDM].
125 JAMES, supra note 85, at 11, 18–19 (Table 2), 28, 30–31; see About the Homestead Act,
NAT’LPARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/home/learn/historyculture/abouthomesteadactlaw
.htm [https://perma.cc/USE8-USUV] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (homestead and indi-
vidual land grants); Railroads in the Late 19th Century, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc
.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial
-america-1876-1900/railroads-in-late-19th-century/ [https://perma.cc/EG2N-VJX9] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2020) (land grants to railroads).
Several more millions of acres of federal land were also donated to the states. See
CONG. RSCH. SERV., FED. GRANTS TO STATE & LOCAL GOVS.: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
ONCONTEMPORARY ISSUES 14–15 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40638.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q3ZU-Y6QR]; see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., FED. LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW
&DATA 2 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GAN-MC7T]
(“Approximately 1.29 billion acres of public domain land was transferred out of federal
ownership between 1781 and 2018.”).
126 Homesteading by the Numbers,NAT’LPARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/home/learn/his
toryculture/bynumbers.htm [https://perma.cc/M7KJ-PMMC] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
127 See JAMES, supra note 85, at 5–6.
128 See id. at 3.
129 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1991)
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natural rights or market theories ignores the role that governmental
land grants—and all the accompanying socio-political considerations—
played in creating property interests in the United States.
In all of these examples, the land itself has not changed; what has
changed is the proportional interest the public has in the land when
compared to the individual or community interest. The same shift is true
in common property.
3. Common Property
Common property, also referred to as common resource property
or as “the commons,” generally refers to land that is shared collectively.
Livestock grazing lands and agricultural lands are prototypes of lands
that may be held in common.
Academic literature on the efficacy of common property regimes
has until recently emphasized the phenomena of the “tragedy of the com-
mons,” made (in)famous by Garrett Hardin to describe scenarios in which
anyone may have access to resources unfettered by regulation.130 The
hypothetical scenario of cattle and sheep grazing unmonitored in a pasture
is the classic example.131 Much has been written on this topic, but under
this theory “the commons” is usually described disparagingly, criticized
as land that is entirely unregulated and not put to its best use, with the
users doomed to overuse the resources.132 The unifying theme of this
(asserting that “most of the real property in the United States was forcibly seized from
American Indians by the United States government, and transferred to non-Indians by
various means and for various purposes”); Seth Davis, Presidential Government and the
Law of Property, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 471, 511–12 (2014) (discussing Johnson v. M’Intosh
and President Andrew Johnson’s forced relocation of Indian Tribes); Chapter Four Aloha
‘ ina: Native Hawaiian Land Restitution, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2148, 2154 (2020) (describing
the change in land possession in Hawai‘i pre- and post-overthrow of the Hawaiian King-
dom, including the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, which dedicated certain lands to
Native Hawaiians for settlement and agriculture but limited recipients based on a blood
quantum of 50 percent Hawaiian ancestry); see also supra Section I.B.1 at nn.56–58 &
accompanying text (discussing Black land loss). For example, in a 2020 holding that may
have significant and lasting implications, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that for purposes
of federal criminal law, land throughout much of eastern Oklahoma reserved for the Creek
Nation since the 19th century remains a Native American territory, notwithstanding the
State of Oklahoma’s efforts to effectively reduce the federal reservation. McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 591 U.S.___, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
130 See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and In-
herently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711–13 & n.7 (1986) [hereinafter Rose,
Comedy of the Commons] (attributing the modern statement on this theory to Hardin).
131 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
132 See Elinor Ostrom, Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions, in PROPERTY
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literature holds that common resource property should be privatized to
impose order and make efficient use of the land.133
This free-for-all scenario rarely exists in the world. In fact the
“tragedy of the commons” hypothetical actually referred only to one
particular—and limited—scenario: a shared but unregulated and unman-
aged resource.134 As Hardin himself later recognized, “[t]he title of [his]
1968 paper should have been ‘The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Com-
mons.’”135
For purposes of this Article, and to understand Hardin’s theory,
it is important to distinguish between the regulated commons and the
unregulated commons, the latter also referred to as “open-access” prop-
erty.136 Open-access refers to a resource that is open to all, to enter and
to use without restriction.137 One might identify unregulated logging in
a tropical rainforest, or fishing on the high seas138 as contemporary
RIGHTS AND LAND POLICIES 29 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2009) [here-
inafter Ostrom, Design Principles], https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles
/2076_1399_LP2008-ch02-Design-Principles-of-Robust-Property-Rights-Institutions_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VVF4-T2QU]; see also Atiram, supra note 43, at 241–47 (responding to
Harold Demsetz’s analysis of the “collective-action problem”); Malagrino, supra note 18,
at 43–44 (noting the complex nature of mixed property regimes and criticizing the assump-
tion that private property regimes are the best or only mechanism); Michel Morin,
Indigenous Peoples, Political Economists and the Tragedy of the Commons, 19 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 559 (2018) (criticizing the assumptions inherent in the tragedy of the com-
mons concept); Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition
Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31J.LEGALSTUD. 653 (2002) (analyzing private
versus common systems of dealing with resource allocation); Rose, Comedy of the Commons,
supra note 130, at 739–49 (discussing custom and customary practices as distinct from
unorganized public use).
133 See, e.g., Ostrom, Design Principles, supra note 132, at 25–26 (summarizing legal and
economic approaches).
134 See Morin, supra note 132, at 569 & n.55; Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The
City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 291–92 & n.43 (2016).
135 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons: Population and the
Disguises of Providence, in COMMONSWITHOUT TRAGEDY:PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
FROM OVERPOPULATION—ANEW APPROACH 162,178(Robert V. Andelson ed.,1991) [here-
inafter Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons].
136 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
552, 557 (2001); Morin, supra note 132, at 567.
137 See Lehavi, supra note 107, at 139 n.1.
138 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons, supra note 135, at 178. But
even on the high seas there are international agreements aimed at limiting overfishing
and bycatch. Public management and control over what was previously considered an
open-access free-for-all now extends 200 nautical miles out in the United States’ Exclusive
Economic Zone, with international agreements and a federal and state-regulated per-
mitting system for the billion dollar pelagic fishing industry. See generally Kamaile A.N.
Tur an, Fisheries Management in American Samoa and the Expanding Application of
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examples. The regulated commons, on the other hand, entails manage-
ment by a group with a right to exclude non-members, typically accord-
ing to historical custom and tradition.139 The theory behind the “tragedy
of the commons” was therefore limited by its own terms to a hypothetical,
open-access scenario with zero regulation; the outcome of Hardin’s
analysis was practically presupposed.140
Unfortunately, and in part based on a misconception of Hardin’s
original work, there is a tendency for academic literature to conflate the
“the commons” with “open-access” property, when a truly open-access
commons is the exception rather than the rule.141 Academia’s preoccupa-
tion with the tragedy of the commons concept distorts the correct view of
property law and serves as an example of the doctrinal misconceptions
born out of oversimplification and assumption. The idea that resource
misuse or collapse was the inevitable result of any common property
regime took hold of generations of lawyers and resource managers, and
the critical distinction between unregulated and regulated commons was
obscured. This, in turn, fed the myth that only individual, private land
ownership can lead to success.142
The absence of regulation or management by either individual,
the community, or an external authority is by no means the norm for
common resource property regimes. Throughout the world, tradition and
social custom, if not explicit government regulation, impose rules on
resource usage in the commons.143 And there is rising interest in the
study of common resource property regimes to address perplexing re-
source issues.144 Carol Rose, Elinor Ostrom, and Eric Freyfogle, among
many others, have pushed back against the superficial generalizations
of the commons trope to engage with the more sophisticated reality.145
Parens Patriae Standing to Challenge Federal Administrative Action, 33 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16–25 (2019) (describing domestic and international regulation
of tuna fisheries).
139 Tur an, supra note 138, at 13–14.
140 See Morin, supra note 132, at 561 (arguing that “the success of Hardin’s paper is due in
great measure to his neglect of economic, scientific, legal and anthropological literature.”).
141 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–3, 48 & n.23, 182–85 (1990) [hereinafter OSTROM,GOVERNING THE
COMMONS]; Peter Larmour, Introduction, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY IN
THE PACIFIC REGION 1–3 (Peter Larmour ed., 2013).
142 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141, at 182–84.
143 See Fred Bosselman et al., The Linkage Between Sustainable Development and Custom-
ary Law, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 12, 16 (2005).
144 Kroncke, supra note 32, at 461.
145 See, e.g., OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141; Rose, Comedy of the
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Recent studies focus on the numerous examples of collective efforts
around the world to manage and use shared resources according to a
society’s distinct rules.146
Approximately half the world’s land is held communally.147 Thus,
to the extent the “tragedy of the commons” was coined as a concept with
universal applicability, that phrase took no account of the successful
common property regimes established around the world by communities
able to self-regulate and manage resource usage.148
Groundbreaking work by Elinor Ostrom evaluated common resource
management regimes in the forests and alpine meadows of Switzerland,
rural mountain villages of Japan, farming communities of the Philip-
pines, shared water irrigation canals of Spain, and elsewhere, to identify
unifying factors across diverse communities that lead to successful shared
management systems that are economically and ecologically sustain-
able.149 She concluded that (as with most things) whether a particular
resource management system fails or succeeds comes down to the details;
no system is categorically successful.150 This is as true for public or private
property regimes as it may be for common property regimes.151 But there
are many examples of successful common property regimes that have
functioned for hundreds if not thousands of years without overexploita-
tion or breakdown in governance.152
Commons, supra note 130; Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECO-
LOGY L.Q. 631, 635–36; (1996); Malagrino, supra note 18; see also Bosselman et al., supra
note 143, at 14, 23–29 (2005) (“Throughout the world, the exploration of systems of
customary law for managing natural resources has become a major research interest for
political scientists, anthropologists, economists and geographers.”).
146 See infra Section I.B.3 (including Wily, Ostrom, and others).
147 Kroncke, supra note 32, at 483; Liz Alden Wily, Collective Land Ownership in the 21st
Century: Overview of Global Trends, LAND 1, 6 (2018) [hereinafter Wily, Collective Land
Ownership] (presenting a global survey of common land ownership).
148 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141, at 58.
149 Id. at 61–88; see Carol Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The Impact of Governing the
Commons on the American Legal Academy, 5 INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 28–49 (2011)
(discussing the impact GOVERNING THE COMMONS had on legal scholarship).
Ostrom went on the win the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory
of Alfred Nobel in 2009 for her work “demonstrating how local property can be success
fully managed by local commons without any regulation by central authorities or privatiza-
tion.” See THENOBELPRIZE,ELINOROSTROM, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic
-sciences/2009/ostrom/facts [https://perma.cc/HZN4-99HC] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
150 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141, at 89.
151 Id. at 1, 7–16.
152 Id. at 58; see also infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text (describing traditional
Hawaiian watershed resource management).
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Ostrom identified eight design principles that successful common
property regimes exhibited.153 These are: (1) clearly defined boundaries,
identifying the rights of users as well as the geographic boundaries of the
common resource itself; (2) self-imposed rules restricting access and usage
that are tailored to the specific shared resource; (3) collective choice and
participation in modifying operational rules to tailor to local circum-
stances; (4) monitors (internal to the group) who hold others accountable;
(5) graduated sanctions imposed by the group for violating operational
rules; (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms that are low-cost and local in
nature; (7) recognition by external government authorities; and (8) for
larger systems, “nested” enterprises or governance organized in multiple
layers, including local, regional, or national.154 Common property regimes
that failed lacked all or most of these features.155 This work demonstrates
that deliberate choices—or lack thereof—lead to failure or success. Failure
is not unavoidable. Stated simply, “many solutions exist to cope with many
different problems.”156 Those who would disregard community efforts to
resolve commons problems exclusively in favor of either government over-
sight or privatization ignore “how these diverse institutional arrangements
operate in practice.”157
One recent analysis of common property regimes revealed that of
100 countries investigated throughout Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas,
and Oceania, seventy-three officially recognize community landholding
in agricultural lands.158 Collective tenure by communities, villages, clans,
or other localized groups is legally recognized in countries as diverse as
Kenya, Spain, Norway, Canada, the United States, Australia, Fiji, Nicara-
gua, and Peru.159 Over half of these community landholding countries
also expressly allow for community owners to sell all or parts of shared
property with the approval of community members.160
153 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141, at 90.
154 Id.; see also Ostrom, Design Principles, supra note 132, at 31–36 (describing method-
ology).
155 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141, at 89, 179–80 & Table 5.2
(identifying certain property regimes that failed or succeeded based on their adoption of
these design principles).
156 Id. at 14.
157 Id. at 21–22.
158 Wily, Collective Land Ownership, supra note 147, at 1, 6. Most of the remaining twenty-
seven countries do still have community landholdings, but they lack official recognition
under the law. Id. at 6.
159 Id. at 6.
160 Id. at 19.
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The fact that some countries do or did not officially recognize
common property regimes does not mean such regimes do not or did not
exist; often the existence of community management systems are simply
ignored by government institutions or prevailing legal theories.
For example, the history of Kenya’s property law system juxta-
poses property law myth and reality.161 Like the United States, Kenya
adopted the English common law when it attained its independence from
colonial rule.162 Whereas the English common law espoused protection of
property rights at the individual level, the majority of land in Kenya was
actually managed at the community level.163 But for decades community-
level management went unrecognized in the lawbooks. The Kenyan
government has recently taken steps to bring the law in alignment with
reality: The Community Land Act of 2016 recognizes that communities
may secure collective title over community lands and lawfully govern this
property with the same legal protections afforded to individuals.164 This
community land may be held in any land tenure system otherwise rec-
ognized under Kenyan law, including leasehold or freehold.165 Under this
property regime, membership and governance is decided at the commu-
nity level, and the distribution of rights and occupancy may be decided
in accordance with traditional community rules and custom (within the
bounds of other statutory or constitutional limitations).166
161 See Liz Alden Wily, The Community Land Act in Kenya Opportunities and Challenges
for Communities, LAND 1 (2018) [hereinafter Wily, The Community Land Act in Kenya],
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/7/1/12 [https://perma.cc/NEY4-GQJT].
162 See Sandra F. Joireman, The Evolution of the Common Law: Legal Development in
Kenya and India, 44 COMMONWEALTH AND COMP.POL.190,190–91 (2006), https://scholar
ship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1076&context=polisci-faculty-publications
[https://perma.cc/JZ53-9W3C] (discussing the transplantation of the common law through
the British Empire through the 18th and 19th centuries); see also CONSTITUTION art.166
(2010) (Kenya), http://www.kenyalaw.org.8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const
2010 [https://perma.cc/MG3L-2L8A] (directing appointment of judges with degrees of
common-law jurisdiction).
163 Joireman, supra note 162, at 194.
164 See Jaron Vogelsang, Opinion: A Historic Step Towards Securing Community Land Rights
in Kenya, THOMAS REUTERS FOUND.NEWS (July 30, 2019), https://news.trust.org/item/20
190730151357-yl708 [https://perma.cc/A6V7-BL9F]; Wily, The Community Land Act in
Kenya, supra note 161, at 1; see The Community Land Act, No. 27 (2016) Kenya Gazette Sup-
plement No. 148 § 27, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/Community
LandAct_27of2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4R4-623P].
165 Wily, The Community Land Act in Kenya, supra note 161, at 1.
166 Id. at 6–7.
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Another example is the common resource management system of
the Indigenous peoples of Australia.167 Not until well into the twentieth cen-
tury were the Indigenous peoples there recognized in academic literature
as resource owners and managers.168 Up until the mid-1900s, publications
described them as “aimless wanderers”169 and “parasites on nature”170
who did not affirmatively manage the land. In reality Indigenous Austra-
lians farmed or managed their ecosystems to ensure long-term productiv-
ity of resources for literally thousands of years.171 Now, scientists and
resource managers have turned to traditional Indigenous methods of
ecological fire management—using purposeful low-intensity fires pre-
cisely timed according to air temperature, wind conditions, humidity, and
plant life cycle—to prevent a recurrence of catastrophic fires like the
ones that devastated the Australian continent in 2019 and 2020.172
A similar pattern of historical land management erasure is evi-
denced by the legal treatment of Native American tribes in the United
States. These communities are not a monolith, but broadly speaking,
many Native American tribes cultivated and permanently occupied their
lands with complex agricultural systems that went largely unacknowl-
edged in Anglo-American literature due to the absence of a private
property system familiar to settlers.173
167 Deborah Bird Rose, Common Property Regimes in Aboriginal Australia: Totemism
Revisited, in THEGOVERNANCE OF COMMONPROPERTY IN THE PACIFICREGION 127–31 (Peter
Larmour ed., 2013), https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/governance-common-property
-pacific-region [https://perma.cc/9XAC-QKXS].
168 Id. at 128.
169 Kilyali Kalit & Elspeth Young, Common Property Conflict and Resolution: Aboriginal
Australia and Papua New Guinea, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY IN THE
PACIFICREGION 183, 187 (Peter Larmour ed., 2013), https://press.anu.edu.au/publications
/governance-common-property-pacific-region [https://perma.cc/HMU4-PX8V].
170 Bird Rose, Common Property Regimes in Aboriginal Australia: Totemism Revisited,
supra note 167, at 128 (citation omitted).
171 Id. at 128–29; Kalit & Young, supra note 169, at 187; Culture, NAT’L INDIGENOUS
AUSTL.AGENCY, https://www.niaa.gov.au/indigenous-affairs/culture-and-capability [https://
perma.cc/4Z2J-Q52V] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
172 Thomas Fuller, Reducing Fire, and Cutting Carbon Emissions, the Aboriginal Way,
N.Y.TIMES(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/world/australia/aborigi
nal-fire-management.html [https://perma.cc/KMT5-FBE2].
173 See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental
Law, 36 HARV.ENV’TL.REV. 169, 180–81 (2012) (describing competing claims to land owner-
ship based on agricultural claims); Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth,
23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 30 (2010) (discussing the court system’s promotion of the legal
fiction that Native Americans simply “wandered” around land and therefore had less
claim to it); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L.
REV. 627, 675 (2006) (comparing representations of agricultural practices in newspapers
and court cases in the 1800s).
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These examples reveal one of the misconceptions accompanying
the myth of individual land ownership—that successful common property
regimes do not exist.
Further, common property regimes are found throughout the
Pacific region, with collective land management predominantly taking
place at the family or village level. There are well-documented examples
that belie any generalization that common property regimes are not
sustainable.174 In addition to Australia, the Solomon Islands, Papua New
Guinea, New Zealand, Vanuatu, and Fiji are examples of countries with
strong histories of communal land management that, in the post-coloni-
zation period, have undergone a series of land reforms to harmonize the
traditional management methods with Anglo- or European-based prop-
erty laws.175 Approximately ninety-five percent of land in Papua New
Guinea, for example, remains communal land under customary title and
subject to management by kinship groups.176
Comparative research on the property systems in New Zealand
(Aotearoa) overlaid by the Maori and English settlers reveals interesting
contrasts and parallels.177 Speaking in broad terms, once the English
arrived in New Zealand, they followed their own tradition and “tended to
allocate property rights in land on a geographic basis. Land was divided
into pieces, each piece was assigned to an owner, and the owner was or-
dinarily understood to command all the resources within that geographic
Early settlers recognized and reported on the complex agricultural systems they
encountered upon arrival in North America; it later became politically and economically
expedient (for some) to “recast” the continental United States as an empty land with no
land tenure. See Purdy, supra note 173.
174 Larmour, supra note 141, at 1; see also Kirsten E. Andersen, Communal Tenure and the
Governance of Common Property Resources in Asia: Lessons from Experiences in Selected
Countries 1 (Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Working Paper No. 20, 2011).
175 See JIM FINGLETON, PACIFIC LAND TENURES: NEW IDEAS FOR REFORM 3, 31 (2008),
http://www.fao.org/3/a-bb106e.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HQB-HUWD]; Larmour, supra note
141, at 11; R. Gerard Ward, Changing Forms of Communal Tenure, in THE GOVERNANCE
OF COMMON PROPERTY IN THE PACIFIC REGION 19, 19–20 (Peter Larmour ed., 2013), https://
press.anu.edu.au/publications/governance-common-property-pacific-region [https://perma
.cc/X635-BMZ8].
176 Kathrine Dixon, Working with Mixed Commons/Anticommons Property: Mobilizing
Customary Land in Papua New Guinea the Melanesian Way, 31 HARV.ENV’T L.REV. 219,
220–21 (2007); Andrew A.L. Lakau, Customary Land Tenure and Common/Public Rights
to Minerals in Papua New Guinea, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY IN THE
PACIFIC REGION 67, 67–68 (Peter Larmour ed., 2013), https://press.anu.edu.au/publica
tions/governance-common-property-pacific-region [https://perma.cc/ZR88-CP9P]; Kalit
& Young, supra note 169, at 186, 200.
177 Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New
Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 810 (1999) [hereinafter Banner, Two Properties].
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space.”178 The Maori, on the other hand, “tended to allocate property rights
among individuals and families on a functional rather than a geographic
basis.”179 Under the Maori system, in the same geographic space one
might have the right to trap birds from a certain tree or the right to fish
from a stream, while another had the right to cultivate a certain plot of
ground.180 Multiple families might have the right to use the same tree for
different purposes, and, moreover, the same family might have the right
to use certain resources in a range of disparate geographic locations.181
These functional rights were passed on through family lines.182 The
English and Maori systems would appear to be at odds.
However, there is more overlap in the Maori and English property
systems than may be initially apparent—the “reality of English landhold-
ing was often more complex” than the single-owner ideal.183 Several
people, not just one person, might own property notwithstanding its
“private” nature,184 a characteristic of collective ownership rather than
individual ownership. And others may possess rights that limit an owner’s
use in the land, such as those who possess future interests in the land or
the government that retains power to limit an owner’s discretion.185 If an
English owner wished to enter into an arrangement with another person
to grant access to that geographic space, mechanisms for this arrange-
ment would be in the form of easements, licenses, and profits familiar to
property law students.186 And “custom had traditionally supported a
community’s claims to use a variety of lands in common: for example,
178 Id.
179 Id. at 811; Sir Hugh Kawharu, Common Property, Maori Identity and the Treaty of
Waitangi, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY IN THE PACIFIC REGION 89–102
(Peter Larmour ed., 2013), https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/governance-common
-property-pacific-region [https://perma.cc/KVE4-WKCQ].
180 Banner, Two Properties, supra note 177, at 811.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 810. My intention in pulling the similarities between English and Maori prop-
erty systems is not to discount the critical distinctions between the two, or to ignore the
incredible change that took place in Indigenous property systems upon colonization by
British or other colonizing countries. For purposes of this Article, the point is that the
focus on enclosures and individual property ownership within Anglo-American property
regimes is a choice, not an inevitability.
184 Id.; see also supra discussion at I.B.1.
185 Banner, Two Properties, supra note 177, at 811; see Antonio Gambaro, Property Rights
in Comparative Perspective: Why Property is so Ancient and Durable, 26 TUL.EUR.&CIV.
L.F. 205, 208–09 (2011) (discussing that even Blackstone conceded the distinction between
theory and reality); supra discussion at I.B.1 (discussing exceptions to the individual
private property owner default).
186 Banner, Two Properties, supra note 177, at 810–11.
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manorial tenants’ rights to graze animals, gather wood, or cut turf on the
manor commons.”187 Thus, “the community claiming customary rights
was really not an ‘unorganized’ public at all.”188
Similar property regimes based on a functional rather than geo-
graphic system were also found throughout much of Europe before en-
closures pulled the focus of land management and tenure systems away
from mixed property regimes.189 Land users might have had the right to
cultivate certain parcels of land dispersed across several fields, for example,
while others had the right to use areas in those same pastures for graz-
ing livestock, while still others had the right to gather resources like nuts
or firewood from those areas.190 Other documented examples include
historical usage of fields in northern Europe, where in the same geo-
graphic area individuals would own strips of land for growing crops while
the community collectively used the fields for grazing livestock.191 And
under the common law custom doctrine, residents of a community “could
claim collective rights to use otherwise private lands in which group
activities had customarily existed without dispute for generations.”192
Even today, land users “‘slice and dice’ entitlements into special-purpose
‘tenure niches’” reminiscent of these historical systems.193
Literally and figuratively closer to home, common property regimes
exist today throughout United States lands in the Pacific. In the unincorpo-
rated territory of American Samoa, for example, land and other resources
are shared communally within each village, with the extended family
considered to be the fundamental unit of the society.194 Communal land
is owned by the family and generally not open to alienation.195 In fact, the
desire to protect American Samoa’s unique political structure and system
187 Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 130, at 740.
188 Id. at 741–42.
189 Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J.LEGAL STUD. 359, 365–66
(2002).
190 Id. at 366; see also Fennell, supra note 27, at 17 (medieval common fields).
191 Lehavi, supra note 107, at 150–51.
192 Id. at 151.
193 See Fennell, supra note 27, at 14–16 (summarizing literature on resource sharing).
194 Tur an, supra note 138, at 12–15; see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/OGC-98-5, RE-
PORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON RES., H.R., U.S. INSULAR AREAS 8–9 & n.10, 23
(1997), https://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/og98005.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y77X-WERN] (de-
scribing the limited application of the U.S. Constitution to the insular territories).
195 Merrily Stover, Individual Land Tenure in American Samoa, 11 THE CONTEMP. PAC.
69, 69–86 (1999), https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/13258 [https://
perma.cc/8GCS-SUMC].
2021] U.S. PROPERTY LAW: A REVISED VIEW 351
of land ownership is one reason the government of American Samoa has
in the past opposed imposition of United States birthright citizenship.196
The State of Hawai‘i (and the territorial government before it)
adopted the Anglo-American property system in the years since incorpo-
ration into the United States, but the property system retains compo-
nents of the communal access land management system that existed in
the pre-colonial era.197 For purposes of natural resource management and
sustaining the activities of everyday life on each island, a land parcel
known as the ahupua‘a was historically the most significant parcel of
land, with each island having multiple such management parcels.198 An
ideal ahupua‘a would be a wedge-shaped section of land running from the
mountain to the sea, following natural geographic boundaries, and would
contain all the resources required to sustain the lives of the people living
within its borders.199 For instance, an ahupua‘a would contain materials
for home building, upland crops, freshwater streams, and nearshore fish
ponds.200 The ahupua‘a would be self-sufficient, and could range in size
from hundreds to thousands of acres.201 Generally speaking, only the
residents of the ahupua‘a were permitted to make use of the ahupua‘a
resources.202 All worked to cultivate crops and engage in other resource
maintenance, while a land agent, known as the konohiki, was responsible
for coordinating the day to day activities of cultivating crops, nearshore
fish, and the construction of irrigation ditches for freshwater.203 This
system flourished for over 1,000 years (estimated).204
Today there is a resurgence in interest in this community approach,
particularly in the agrarian or fishing realms. The State has approved
community-based subsistence fishing areas in nearshore waters, noting
196 Tur an, supra note 138, at 14; see Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 309–10 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
197 See generally Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Ke Ala Loa—the Long Road: Native
Hawaiian Sovereignty and the State of Hawai‘i, 47 TULSA L. REV. 621 (2012) (describing
the relationship between the State of Hawai‘i and the Native Hawaiian population).





202 Id.; see MacKenzie, supra note 197, at 647.
203 See HANDBOOK, supra note 198, at 3.
204 Kahikino Noa Dettweiler, Racial Classification or Cultural Identification?: The Gathering
Rights Jurisprudence of Two Twentieth Century Hawaiian Supreme Court Justices, 6 ASIAN
-PAC.L.&POL’Y J. 174, 179 (2005) (“Archaeologists have posited that the first Polynesian
voyagers arrived in Hawaii around A.D. 300.”).
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“overwhelming support from the local community” that is “critical to sus-
taining natural resources,” and with a “strong recognition that government
cannot do it alone.”205 Community-based organizations (through public and
private funding) are reclaiming private or state lands to cultivate agricul-
tural systems blending both Anglo-American and Hawaiian land man-
agement regimes, resulting in enhanced access to locally sourced food.206
These specific examples are just a few of the many variations on
collective management of common property throughout the United States.
Other examples include land trusts, neighborhood-managed parks, agri-
cultural cooperatives, housing cooperatives, homeowners associations, and
condominium regimes, increasingly common even in private property, as
discussed above.207 Citizen shareholder or common interest communities
have emerged in the last few decades to manage commonly owned assets,
including land or housing units.208
A holistic view of all these practices in private, public, and common
property reveals that there is and always has been flexibility to adapt
property regimes to fit time, place, and societal interest.209 Within the
Anglo-American property system the prevailing view has been a focus on
individual private ownership, but there is renewed interest in property
regimes reflecting the mixed nature of interests in property.210 This revised
view should form the basis of property law theory moving forward.
205 H ‘ena Community-Based Subsistence Fishing Area Rule Signed by Governor, STATE
HAW. DIV. AQUATIC RES., https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/dar/announcements/haena-community
-based-subsistence-fishing-area-rule-signed-by-governor/ [https://perma.cc/J88D-78AR] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2020); see HAW. ADMIN. R. §§ 13–60.8-1 et seq.
206 One such organization, K ko‘o ‘ iwi, obtained a land lease from the state for a “405-
acre parcel to implement activities related to and supportive of cultural practices,
agriculture, education, and natural-resource restoration and management,” with an
emphasis on locally grown food in coordination with community groups to enhance food
sustainability in Hawai‘i. History of He‘eia, K KO‘O ‘ IWI, https://kakoooiwi.org/historyof
heeia/ [https://perma.cc/8H2F-VZBY] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
207 See supra Section I.B.1; Malagrino, supra note 18, at 57–59; Kroncke, supra note 32,
at 486–500.
208 See Lehavi, supra note 107, at 160–61; Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Com-
munities Work: The Next Step, 37 URB. L. 359, 359 (2005) (“A large and growing portion
of the housing stock of America is located in common interest communities governed by
owner associations.”); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1183 (1999) (“Common-interest communities (CICs), including residential sub-
divisions, condominiums, and cooperatives are perhaps the most significant form of social
reorganization of late twentieth-century America.”).
209 See Banner, Two Properties, supra note 177, at 812; see also David Callies, How Custom
Becomes Law in England, in THEROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT
158–223 (2005) (discussing how customary law is interpreted, or misinterpreted, by U.S.
courts over time and in different regions of the country).
210 Lehavi, supra note 107, at 107.
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II. THE REVISED VIEW
It is time, as Ostrom encouraged, to “move our understanding
ahead of earlier theories.”211 To continue to focus on individual rights—
with the correlative focus on the supposed absence of individual rights
in public or common property regimes—advances an oversimplified theory
of property. Instead, the meaningful characteristic of “owning property”
is the varying proportion of individual, community, and public interests
in land, depending on the characteristics of the land and activities
conducted there.
A. The Revised View: Proportionality of Interests
The revised view recognizes that individual, community, and public
interests coexist. To avoid a myopic focus on one to the exclusion of others,
this view analyzes the relative proportion of those interests.
For example, Chart 1 depicts three land parcels reflecting the
proportion of individual-community-public interests.
CHART 1: PROPORTIONAL INTERESTS
211 Ostrom, Design Principles, supra note 132, at 27.
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The Single-Family Home:
• Individual Interest: The individual interest is pro-
portionally highest. The homeowner may come and
go from the property at will, exclude others, sell the
property if desired, and use it at his or her discretion
(in accordance with the law).
• Community Interest: Restrictive covenants and
homeowners’ association rules may limit certain
uses of the property. Neighbors or utility companies
may have easements or other access agreements to
the property. Neighbors have a right to protect their
own property against private nuisances, and in
turn the ambiance of the neighborhood will impact
the market value of the single-family home.
• Public Interest: The public’s interest is reflected in
zoning laws, ordinances, frontage setbacks, or other
rules imposed on the property. The government may
sue to enjoin public nuisances, and may impose
regulatory takings or condemn the property with
just compensation. The homeowner will also turn
to the government for assistance with enforcing his
or her rights in the property.
The Neighborhood Garden:
• Individual Interest: Individuals may enter and ob-
tain resources for personal use according to the rules
set by the community or government entity. Depend-
ing on the tenure status of the garden, the property
itself may be susceptible to enclosure, conversion, or
sale, resulting in termination of individual interests.
• Community Interest: The community interest is pro-
portionally highest. By informal agreement, written
charter, or municipal rule, the designated commu-
nity group determines use and access to the re-
sources. All within the designated community have
rights to the resource, but the land may be
restricted from the larger population.
• Public Interest: The public’s interest is reflected in
zoning laws, ordinances, or other rules imposed on
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the property, and may also exist in the form of
agreements—either informal or formal—with the
community group to support or enforce community
governance.
The National Forest:
• Individual Interest: Individuals may enter the prop-
erty for recreation and enjoyment in accordance
with the law. Individuals may also extract or make
use of resources pursuant to a license or permit
issued by the government.
• Community Interest: The surrounding community
has an interest in the preservation of natural re-
sources in their regions, with the benefit of clean
air, water, and natural landscapes. The managing
agency may enter into agreements with community
groups for trail maintenance or other volunteer
projects.
• Public Interest: The public’s interest—represented
by the government—is proportionally highest. The
government regulates the land and ultimately de-
cides which individuals or corporations (if any) have
access to or use of the property. The government
may also hold the property in trust for the general
public, whereby the public benefits from conserva-
tion of natural resources, clean air, and clean water.
The new view reconceives what it means to own property. “Owner-
ship” should no longer refer to only a bundle of rights for an individual
owner.212 Property ownership needs to be seen anew for what it really is:
a proportional collection of individual, community, and public interests.
Property law needs a new metaphor.
B. From Bundles of Sticks to Apple Pie: A Revised Metaphor for a
Revised View
To this end, there have been a number of efforts through the years
to advance beyond the bundle of sticks concept to more accurately describe
212 See supra Section II.B.
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the complexities of property ownership. One such adjustment envisions
a cord securing the bundle of sticks, with the cord representing the larger
public interest in land.213 An idea from the environmental realm would
add a stick of green (live) wood to the bundle, to represent the environ-
mental considerations accompanying rights in property.214 Another sug-
gestion would envision rights in property as a tree, to emphasize the
interconnectedness of various interests in property and the social and
ecological context to real property.215 Yet another alternative would rep-
resent the property regime as a triangle, representing private property,
common property, and public property types, with many properties falling
at interim points along the sides of the triangle and within it.216
These proposals, however, are ultimately only partially right. The
public cord encircling the bundle, despite having a certain appeal, has sev-
eral limitations. First, it does not acknowledge the community interest
as distinct from the public interest.217 More fundamentally, it does not
address the individualistic aspect of each component stick in the tradi-
tional bundle; the visual imagery seems to accept the premise that the
rights themselves are individual in the first instance, but with an overlay
of governmental regulations.218 Thus, there is no way to metaphorically
transfer the public’s (or the community’s) continued interest in any par-
ticular stick when the stick (the right) is transferred to another owner.
The green wood metaphor accomplishes part of what the cord does not, in
that the imagery demonstrates that environmental obligations should be
considered alongside the other rights in property.219 But it begs the ques-
tion whose interest is reflected in environmental considerations. The tree
metaphor is helpful insofar as it situates property within a broader social
and environmental context, but the visual is imprecise and offers no obvi-
ous way to metaphorically transfer rights (besides taking a metaphorical
chainsaw to the tree, which would seem to send the wrong message).
The triangle metaphor is closest to what is ultimately proposed in
this Article, in that it expressly accounts for the mixed nature of property
according to the type of land resource at issue.220 And because triangles
213 Duncan, supra note 3, at 803–07 (commenting on the usefulness of the bundle metaphor
as an instructive tool and critiquing it from an environmentalist perspective).
214 Goldstein, supra note 19, at 407–29.
215 di Robilant, supra note 19, at 931.
216 Lehavi, supra note 107, at 138.
217 See generally Duncan, supra note 3, at 803–07.
218 Id.
219 Goldstein, supra note 19, at 407–29.
220 Lehavi, supra note 107, at 138.
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are capable of changing shape according to the varying lengths, the trian-
gle can represent the shifting proportions of individual, community, and
public interests in land according to its type and use (once equilateral,
now scalene, etc.). But while acknowledging this mixture of interests in
the land as a whole, the triangle metaphor does not offer an obvious way
to conceive of the mixture of interests in each type of right in land or of
how to transfer a portion of the rights in land while maintaining the
remaining collection of rights.
So, the doctrinal metaphor used to represent real property juris-
prudence must account for, among the various rights and entitlements,
the obligations accompanying those rights and the community and pub-
lic’s concurrent interests in those rights.221 This would be a more mean-
ingful and accurate metaphor for scholars, the courts, and law students
alike. And the new metaphor, in turn, will guide real property regimes
to implement the new view.
Rights in property resemble an apple pie. The pie as a whole
represents the land parcel and the entirety of rights and obligations that
attend that parcel. The proportion of individual-community-public property
interests is represented by the three layers of the pie:
• The public interests in land are represented by the
bottom layer of crust forming the foundation of the
pie; property rights are often a creation of govern-
ment and society as a whole, and owners rely on
mechanisms of government (law enforcement, the
courts, legal rules) to enforce those rights.
• The community interests in land are represented by
the upper layer of crust; the neighboring commu-
nity is distinct from the general public at large,
and the community may claim interests, through
easements or restrictive covenants, for example,
that may either restrict or support the exercise of
individual rights.
• The individual interests in land are represented by
the filling of the pie; they include the rights to use,
to exclude, to profit, and other individual interests
recognized by law or custom.
221 See Duncan, supra note 3, at 775 (“One individual’s interest in land cannot be defined
without taking into account the interests of neighbors and the larger human and natural
communities.”).
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Figure 1 Apple Pie: Proportional Interests in Property
Transferring an individual interest in property transfers the
corresponding public and community interests along with it.
In the event any particular individual interest is transferred, that
interest (the pie filling) would carry with it the community and public
interests and associated obligations (the top and bottom crust) in that
right. Once transferred, the original holder of the interests has a missing
slice—one fewer right to exercise.
The next step in the evolution of property law is to affirmatively
recognize that this mix of interests is not an exception to the rule but
instead is the rule itself. Property rights are like slices of pie, not sticks
in a bundle. And an individual’s decisions impact—and are impacted by—
the community and public interests that form the structure of the pie.
C. Property Regimes Under the Revised View
The revised view reflects the proportionality of interests in property;
the view itself (as depicted by the apple pie) does not change anything,
but rather more accurately captures these interests. The view then
supports a range of property regimes that society may overlay to govern
the use, stewardship, and ownership of land. These property regimes define
the rules, rights, obligations, and societal relationships with respect to
the parcel of land.
Because the size and needs of the population and the character of
land varies from one locality to the next, there will be no one solution, no
one property regime to implement the revised view. On the contrary,
there may be as many solutions as communities in this country—urban,
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suburban, and rural. But the consistent theme must be that the mixed
nature of property meaningfully influences the property regime, with the
relative proportion of individual, community, and public interests in a
particular piece of land guiding the choice of property regime.
How, then, to design these property regimes? Individuals, communi-
ties, and governments do not need to start from scratch. As described in
Section I.B, there are myriad examples in countries around the world
(including the U.S.) from which to learn.222 Researchers have evaluated
current and historical mixed property regimes and gleaned principles con-
sistent across successful strategies.223 Ostrom described eight components
of these successful regimes, including clearly defined boundaries, self-
imposed rules, collective choice and participation, internal monitors,
sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, external recognition, and
multi-layered governance for larger systems.224 Each component would
require a deliberate choice on the part of all stakeholders to establish a
regime accounting for the mix of interests.225 One of the threshold ques-
tions is whether establishment and enforcement of the property regime
will be driven internally at the local community level or externally at the
county, state, or even national level.226 The optimal strategy will vary
according to locality and type of land parcels at issue, whether residen-
tial condominium units, single-family homes, livestock grazing lands,
community gardens, or large-scale agriculture.227
For agricultural land in particular, the community’s interest in
access to the scarce resource—land capable of producing food to sustain
the community—is relatively high. The property regime would therefore
need to reflect this proportionality. The regime could take any number
of forms, and depending on the size of the land, Ostrom’s nested system
of governance and regulation228 may be advantageous, with the local
community (be it village, township, or city) managing the food production
while the county or state government maintains a certain oversight role
to evaluate externalities or other regional land concerns. For example:
222 See supra Section I.B; see also, e.g., OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note
141, at 182.
223 See generally OSTROM,GOVERNING THE COMMONS,supra note 141; Wily, The Community
Land Act in Kenya, supra note 161.
224 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141, at 90; see supra Section I.B.3.
225 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 141, at 90.
226 See id. at 101–02.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 90.
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• Collective Title: Perhaps the most direct way to in-
corporate the inherently collective aspects of agricul-
ture is to develop a collective title regime geared
specifically to agricultural land, wherein land is
held by an identifiable collective group based on
locality. There are models of this strategy through-
out the world, discussed above,229 which can be
tailored to locality- and community-specific needs.
Within the conventional Anglo-American property
system, this would be a form of concurrent estate,
minus the preoccupation with individual interests.
Under this regime, agricultural land is capable of
being held in fee by the community under a collec-
tive title. Benefits to this approach include: encour-
aging investment in land; creations of markets for
food; the right to exclude others; and the rights to
use, sell, or profit. And larger plots held in collective
title rather than under individual titles will afford
the scale of resources necessary to spread the re-
sponsibility and risks across the larger community.
This shared risk will potentially remedy, or offset,
the challenges faced today by individual farmers
struggling to hold on to land or to surmount barriers
to entering the farming business. The revised view
is reflected in this regime in the form of shared title,
and co-management by the other title owners. En-
forcement may take place internally through restric-
tive covenants or other association-type restrictions,
with the internal management structure decided
on a case-by-case basis. Recognition of this regime
under state law with the corresponding ability to
enforce these rules, as is the case with the recent
Community Land Act in Kenya, is a necessity.230
229 See supra Section I.B.3.
230 Lack of legal recognition for communal efforts in urban gardens and their resulting
inability to compete with market forces, for instance, is one of the major reasons urban
gardens may not survive long-term. Cahn & Segal, supra note 116, at 199–212, 230. But
times are changing. Legal recognition of communities as owners of their lands is “an in-
creasingly accepted element of property relations. The conventional meaning of property
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• Citizen Shareholder Corporation: A citizen share-
holder corporation shares similarities with a collec-
tive title regime, but whereas collective title may
conceivably be shared by residents of an entire town
by virtue of residency, a shareholder corporation
would require individuals to either form or buy into
a corporation that then manages agricultural land
or production on a regional level. Germany’s Region-
alwert is one such example of these corporations.
Individuals purchase shares in the corporation to
provide capital to acquire agricultural land or en-
terprises throughout the region to promote orga-
nized and sustainable development of agricultural
lands.231 Reflecting the proportional interests of the
revised view, shares cannot be sold without the
consent of other shareholders, and the restricted
transferability provides some stability in the pro-
gram.232 This regime thus maintains familiar as-
pects of individual rights in title but also accounts
for broader societal interests in the land.
• Community Land Trusts: The community land trust
also requires the creation of a separate entity that
represents the community, and the land trust may
acquire land either through donation or purchase.
The type of possessory interest that land trusts
have tends to be leasehold, rather than fee, which
means decreased security and long-term predict-
ability.233 This may be a desirable option for cities
or townships with political appetite for granting
long-term leases of public lands for agricultural
use. The prevalence of community garden efforts or
in land itself is changing, allowing for a greater diversity of attributes without impairing
legal protection.” Wily, Collective Land Ownership, supra note 147, at 1.
231 See Christian Hiss, Regional Value-added Citizen Shareholder Corporation, U.N. CONF.
ON TRADE & DEV., TRADE & ENV’T REV. 301, 301–04 (2013), https://unctad.org/en/Publica
tionsLibrary/ditcted2012d3_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J8A-R6M3] (describing the Regional
Value-added Citizen Shareholder Corporation in Southern Germany); Access to Land,
REGIONALWERTAG, https://www.accesstoland.eu/-Regionalwert-AG- [https://perma.cc/28
LU-797E] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
232 Hiss, supra note 231, at 303–04.
233 See, e.g., Kroncke, supra note 32, at 486–501.
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formalized nonprofit organizations demonstrate
that this type of system can be successful, and the
lack in stability of ownership could be at least par-
tially offset by long-term leases, such as renewable
ninety-nine-year terms. Organizers may look to
successful examples of communal land trusts in
the housing context, such as the Caño Martín Peña
Community Land Trust in San Juan in Puerto Rico,
which won the 2015–2016 UN World Habitat Award
for innovations in housing strategies.234
• Zoning and Regulatory Incentives: In addition to or
in lieu of the above community-focused strategies,
government entities may pass zoning restrictions
requiring, or regulatory incentives encouraging,
landowners to dedicate a portion of crop land to
growing food for surrounding areas. These “food
security set-asides” would be akin to residential
development standards that require building set-
backs in neighborhoods, or to inclusionary zoning
programs that require a certain number of newly
constructed residential units be set aside for afford-
able housing.235 Another option would be to focus on
output rather than the land itself, and require a
certain percentage of crops grown on agricultural
land be sold first to local grocers, farmers markets,
schools, and hospitals before export. Yet another
option would be for each locality (for instance, a
municipality) to have its own “foodshed” that sup-
plies its food, much like a city may have a water-
shed.236 In any case, food security becomes part of
234 Wily, Collective Land Ownership, supra note 147, at 12; Urban Waters Partnership:
Achievements & Accomplishments in Caño Martín Peña, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/urban
waterspartners/achievements-and-accomplishments-cano-martin-pena [https://perma.cc
/7W6W-ABHY] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020); see generally Malagrino, supra note 18 (discus-
sing community land trusts in the context of housing).
235 See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 604 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of setbacks
or building lines); 3 Loc. Gov’t L. § 16:74 (inclusionary zoning); Annotation, Power to Estab-
lish Building Line Along Street, 53 A.L.R. 1222 (discussing setbacks and minimum lot
size ordinances); CALLIES,CONCISEINTRODUCTION,supra note 19, at 251–334 (discussing
zoning ordinances and land use controls); SINGER, supra note 9, at 635–71 (similar).
236 See VANDANA SHIVA, WHO REALLY FEEDS THE WORLD 130–31 (2016).
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land use planning. This approach to effectuating
the revised view emphasizes a top-down, external
mechanism for establishing and enforcing the
property regime. It presents the potential benefits
of consistent enforcement and funding, but requires
broad political support and, depending on levels of
generality inherent in the regulations, may reduce
flexibility to create locality-specific regimes.
• Easements or Other Servitudes: Conservation
easements—such as the “cows over condos” agree-
ments discussed above—are already commonplace
mechanisms to preserve certain lands from urban
or commercial development. And the USDA Natu-
ral Resources Conservation Service already invests
millions of dollars into its Agricultural Conserva-
tion Easement Program to help individuals, land
trusts, and others protect agricultural lands.237 Com-
munity groups and local governments can similarly
pursue arrangements with agricultural land own-
ers to ensure a certain amount of food production
goes toward foodstuffs for the local market rather
than export or the commodities trade. The revised
view is reflected in this regime by restricting cer-
tain individual uses to the benefit of community
agricultural needs. In order to fully reflect the pro-
portionality of interests, these servitudes would
need to be large scale and involve all stakeholders,
not just a few parties, with commensurate enforce-
ment handled either internally or externally.
Any of these five options—or another option altogether—may be the
optimal choice depending on locality and community. These property
regimes should be part of the broader discussion about the future of
agricultural land as it pertains to local and national food security, dis-
cussed below.238
237 News Release, USDA Nat. Res. Conserv. Serv., USDA Offers Conservation Assistance
to Landowners to Protect Wetlands, Agricultural Lands & Grasslands (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/newsroom/releases/?cid=NR
CSEPRD1450419 [https://perma.cc/5BVW-NFL3].
238 See infra discussion at Part III.
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III. ACHIEVING FOOD SECURITY UNDER THE REVISED VIEW
Agricultural land239 occupies a unique status in property regimes.
Under Anglo-American property law, an individual may hold agricultural
land in fee simple with all the various rights in the conventional bundle
of sticks; and yet arable land capable of sustaining agriculture is not
interchangeable with non-arable land. The public and community inter-
est in agricultural land (and the products derived from it) is proportion-
ally high, notwithstanding an individuals’ right to use or profit from that
land. When scholars discuss property regimes in the context of agricul-
tural land, what they are talking about is nothing less than a society’s
ability to feed itself.
The conventional view accepted that a landowner—whether an
individual or, increasingly, a corporation—may make whatever use of
arable land that the owner may choose without regard to whether there
is other arable land to feed the region. In other words, without regard to
what the surrounding population requires to be food secure. Taken to its
logical extreme, the individual’s rights to use and to exclude and to profit
and to sell can result in a small number of owners dedicating all arable
land to export or trade on the commodities market, leaving little to no agri-
cultural products available to provide food for entire regions of people.
The result: the Nation’s food system is vulnerable. This vulnera-
bility was made all too clear during the COVID-19 pandemic, which
revealed that many cities and towns are mere days away from having no
food once interstate delivery systems break down.240 As the pandemic
forced delivery systems to slow or shut down, daily news stories depicted
a startling contrast: farmers in California left their vegetable crops to die
in the fields and farmers in the Midwest euthanized livestock and dumped
thousands of gallons of milk, while unprecedented numbers of people in
other parts of the country went hungry—turned away from food banks
suffering food shortages.241 Long lines to the food pantry242 and shriveled
239 By the term “agricultural” land, I refer both to land that has been put to agricultural
production as well as arable land that is capable of sustaining agriculture.
240 Chloe Hadavas, “We’re in a Save-Our-Farm-From-Collapsing Mode,” SLATE (Apr. 12,
2020), https://slate.com/human-interest/2020/04/csa-farmers-markets-coronavirus-demand
-rise.html [https://perma.cc/6N93-WLJT].
241 Laura Reiley, Full Fields, Empty Fridges, WASH.POST (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/23/fixing-food-dumping-food-banks/?arc404=true
[https://perma.cc/4NSE-GP7A]; Sydney Page, Extra Food is Rotting on Farms while Ameri-
cans Go Hungry, WASH.POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle
/2020/06/10/extra-food-is-rotting-farms-while-americans-go-hungry-this-group-is-trying
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crops dead in the dirt evoked our collective memories of the Dust Bowl
and the Great Depression. How did this happen?
Property regimes are just a component of the food supply chal-
lenges during national and global shocks like the pandemic, of course.243
But property laws, and all of the assumptions about who has rights in
land, are a foundational aspect to land use and the agricultural system
in the United States. Thus, the bundle of sticks emphasis on individual
property rights has played a major role in enabling the current food
supply model.244
The unusual confluence of events triggered by the pandemic ex-
posed the inherent risk in the current food production and delivery system
in America as it developed under the fragmented and individualistic view
of property law. The food supply chain is longer and more complex than it
ever has been. Over the last several decades, the distance that food travels
from farm to table has grown.245 Many localities do not grow enough to
support their community even at a basic level, and the food stocking
grocery store shelves often comes not just from another state but from
another country.
One reason for this long supply chain is that farmers in the United
States increasingly sell to restaurants who will pay higher prices, which
-fix-that/ [https://perma.cc/4FGD-ATKY] (describing that “[f]arms have a surplus of food
from canceled restaurant contracts and a shattered supply chain, while food banks are
experiencing a staggering surge in demand”); see also Coronavirus and USDA Assistance
for Farmers, U.S.DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.farmers.gov/coronavirus [https://perma.cc
/74SS-43DV] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (describing USDA aid to farmers during the
coronavirus pandemic).
242 Michelle Conlin et al., U.S. Food Banks Run Short on Staples as Hunger Soars, THOMSON
REUTERS NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus
-foodbanks-insight/u-s-food-banks-run-short-on-staples-as-hunger-soars-idUSKCN226
1AY [https://perma.cc/Z7X7-D825]; Eoin Higgins, ‘Unforgettable’ Footage of Endless Line of
Cars at Food Banks a Stark Illustration of Coronavirus Crisis in US, COMMON DREAMS
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/04/10/unforgettable-footage-end
less-line-cars-food-banks-stark-illustration-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/E8JH-2ECB].
243 Food packing and processing facilities, for instance, are not functioning at full capacity
due to decreasing staffing in the face of a communicable disease.
244 Others have advocated for greater acceptance of mixed property regimes, although not
directly addressing the question of food security. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 3, at 804
(advancing a theory of property rights that accounts for the interconnectedness of society
and environmental issues); Lehavi, supra note 107, at 140 (advocating for “normative
support for explicit mixed types of property regimes, whenever these may prove optimal
to obtain society’s goals”).
245 See Xiaowen Lin et al., Food Flows Between Counties in the United States, ENV’TRSCH.
LETTERS 14 (2019), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab29ae/pdf [https://
perma.cc/E7PB-USAF].
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means that farmers ship their food across the country and tailor what they
grow according to what will sell at a restaurant, not a local market.246
Grocery stores, on the other hand, tend to import produce from countries
that will charge lower prices.247 And because the processing, packaging,
and labeling of grocery or restaurant products are not interchangeable,
nor are the products themselves the same, a farm set up for long-distance
deliveries cannot easily pivot from shipping goods nationally to deliver-
ing locally to grocery stores.248
Another reason communities rely on food that has crossed hun-
dreds or thousands of miles before arriving at the local grocer is because
farms in the United States are increasingly growing food for export and
for sale on the commodities market rather than for regional consump-
tion.249 Thus, even if a locality has enough land to feed the surrounding
community, it may not actually do so.250 Instead, wheat, corn, soy, and
other cash crops are grown in large quantities for export, not for local
consumption.251 The revised view would balance the individual’s interest
246 Reiley, supra note 241.
247 Id.
248 See Greg DeCroix, Professor, Grainger Ctr. for Supply Chain Mgmt., Wis. Sch. of Bus.,
Presentation on Food Supply in the Age of COVID-19, YOUTUBE (May 19, 2020), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=al0Df-qO1UE&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/5JUS-9GUE];
Heather White, Assistant Professor, U. Wis. Dep’t of Dairy Sci., Presentation on Food Supply
in the Age of COVID-19, YOUTUBE (May 19, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=al
0Df-qO1UE&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/TW97-VTPX].
249 Ed Maixner, Farm Exports: A Starring Role in U.S. Agriculture’s Profitability, AGRI-
PULSE (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/10851-farm-exports-a-star
ring-role-in-us-agricultures-profitability [https://perma.cc/H7WN-C78Y].
250 In Hawai‘i, although there is enough arable land to substantially feed the community,
a majority of that land is put towards “seed, coffee and other nutritionally unimportant




251 According to the USDA, corn is the primary feed grain, and while corn acreage in the
United States is approximately ninety million acres, much of this corn (approximately
forty percent) goes to ethanol production, not food. The next ten to twenty percent of corn
is exported, and significant portion of the remainder is put towards livestock feed. See
USDA ECON. RES. SERV., FEEDGRAINS SECTOR AT A GLANCE (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www
.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn-and-other-feedgrains/feedgrains-sector-at-a-glance/
[https://perma.cc/3YBS-98FH]; Tom Capehart & Susan Proper, Corn is America’s Largest
Crop in 2019, USDA ECON. RES. SERV. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog
/2019/07/29/corn-americas-largest-crop-2019 [https://perma.cc/75YL-HW2J].
Wheat is the primary food grain, and wheat ranks third among U.S. field crops in
planted acreage, production, and gross farm receipts, behind corn and soybeans. See USDA
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in profits with the surrounding community’s and public’s interests in
reliable access to regionally sourced food.
This focus on agricultural land as a mechanism to create products
for sale rather than nourishment has coincided not only with long, in-
secure supply chains but also with the decline of farming as a livelihood.
U.S. farmers are experiencing near record levels of debt, reminiscent of
the farming crisis in the 1980s, which itself had been the worst crisis
since the Great Depression.252 Bankruptcies are up nearly thirty-two
percent since 2014,253 and America’s farmers and ranchers have experi-
enced a nearly fifty percent drop in net farm income over the last seven
years due to a crash in commodities prices.254
When farm owners and leaseholders (whether individual or
corporations) tailor their agricultural land to growing cash crops, the
viability of those crops become vulnerable to price speculation, changes
in the energy market, and international trade tensions. Soybean exports
to China, for instance, dropped seventy-five percent from 2017 to 2018,
and key commodity prices in corn, soybean, and wheat have dropped by
nearly half since 2012.255
ECON.RES.SERV.,WHEAT SECTOR AT A GLANCE (June26,2020), https://www.ers.usda.gov
/topics/crops/wheat/wheat-sector-at-a-glance/ [https://perma.cc/SF6J-8TTN]; see also USDA
ECON. RES. SERV., AGRICULTURAL TRADE (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data
-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/agricultural-trade/ [https://perma
.cc/AQ4V-LGNK].
Moreover, the rise in the commodities market correlates with the market concen-
tration of corporations involved in providing the inputs (seeds, pesticides, equipment) and
corporations that process, package, and purchase the outputs (crops), with less flexibility
available to the farmer to control what happens to the food grown on the farm. ZOE
WILLINGHAM & ANDY GREEN, A FAIR DEAL FOR FARMERS RAISING EARNINGS AND RE-
BALANCINGPOWER IN RURALAMERICA1, 4–7 (2019), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/con
tent/uploads/2019/05/02131411/Fair-Deal-for-Farmers.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HWZ-RZF6].
The result is that direct farmer-to-consumer sales make up a negligible portion of
most farmers’ sales. Instead, farmers’ real customers are processors, grain traders, and
marketers and packagers. Id. at 6.
252 Katie Wedell et al., Midwest Farmers Face a Crisis, USA TODAY NETWORK (Mar. 9,
2020), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/03/09/climate-tariffs
-debt-and-isolation-drive-some-farmers-suicide/4955865002/ [https://perma.cc/WY4D-HJ6C];
FARM AID, UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS FAMILY FARMS ARE FACING (Oct. 8,
2019), https://www.farmaid.org/blog/fact-sheet/understanding-economic-crisis-family-farms
-are-facing/#8text [https://perma.cc/28GY-RHEV]; Debbie Weingarten, Why Are America’s
Farmers Killing Themselves?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2017/dec/06/why-are-americas-farmers-killing-themselves-in-record-num
bers [https://perma.cc/GSQ4-27MK].
253 FARM AID, supra note 252.
254 Id.; Weingarten, supra note 252.
255 Wedell et al., supra note 252.
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Focusing on crops as commodities rather than food has, in turn,
contributed to the decline in small and midsize family farms. These
farms are often too small to compete in the global market.256 According
to the USDA, over the last thirty years, the percentage of cropland acres
operated by midsize farms has decreased from fifty-seven percent to
thirty-three percent, while the percentage of cropland acres operated by
large farms has grown from fifteen percent to forty-one percent.257 Be-
tween 2007 and 2012, nearly 56,000 midsize farms were lost nationally.258
This has serious ramifications for rural communities, where midsize
farms tend to employ more people per acre than larger industrial farms.259
This, in turn, has set off a cascade effect resulting in farm collapse and
depopulation in rural areas.260
High costs for land and equipment, access to insurance, and oppor-
tunity costs are significant barriers to new farmers entering the business
and to existing farmers who wish to transition from monoculture cash
crops to diversified crops of nutritionally higher value.261 The high buy-in
costs and financial risk associated with farming has resulted in declining
interest in farming by the younger generation. The USDA 2016 report on
the status of land tenure and farming found that approximately one-
third of the U.S. farming population is at least age sixty-five, compared
with only twelve percent of other self-employed workers in nonagricul-
tural business, with little to no farmland anticipated to be sold on the
competitive market.262 The USDA determined that “[l]and tenure and
ownership, therefore, has significant bearing on both the current and
future state of the U.S. agricultural economy.”263
256 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 231, at 277 (attributing the decline in small
farms in the U.S. to inability to compete in the commodities market).
257 JAMESM.MACDONALD, USDAECON.RES.SERV.,CONSOLIDATION IN U.S.AGRICULTURE
CONTINUES(Feb. 3,2020),https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2020/february/consolida
tion-in-us-agriculture-continues/ [https://perma.cc/X6QQ-RCW9].
258 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, GROWING ECON. 1 (2016), https://www.ucsusa.org
/sites/default/files/attach/2016/01/ucs-growing-economies-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG75
-H7G3] (applying USDA data).
259 Id.
260 Wedell et al., supra note 252.
261 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 258, at 5.
262 USDAECON.RES.SERV.,U.S.FARMLAND OWNERSHIP,TENURE &TRANSFER 1, 33 (2016),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/74672/eib-161.pdf?v=0 [https://perma.cc
/6SX6-K82B]; see also id. at 35 (noting that the distribution of agricultural land across
entire communities, to what uses they are put, and the tenure system in place, is critical
to food security).
263 Id. at 1.
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All of these factors compound to put farmers under significant
financial and emotional stress. According to a January 2020 study from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, farmers are among the
most likely to die by suicide when compared with other occupations.264 A
2017 University of Iowa study found that farmers and ranchers had a
suicide rate on average 3.5 times that of the general population.265 And
Farm Aid, a nonprofit whose mission is to help farmers keep their land
and manage stressors, reported that in 2018 it experienced a thirty
percent increase in calls to their crisis hotline.266
There is no one explanation for these crises, of course, but the
numbers are emblematic of the fact that, on a deeply personal level, the
agricultural system in the United States is not working for the individu-
als who farm the land.
The food supply system does not work for many communities,
either. Communities become reliant on a national and global food supply
chain. The result is that in the event of a supply chain failure, cities and
towns in states across the country have only a few days or weeks before
the food runs out. The State of Hawai‘i, for instance, is over 2,000 miles
from the continental United States but nevertheless imports nearly ninety
percent of its food.267 According to estimates, Hawai‘i has at most three
264 Cora Peterson et al., Suicide Rates by Indus. & Occupation, 69 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 57, 57, 60 (2020), https://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6903a1-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZH4-HNU8];
Wedell et al., supra note 252.
265 Wedell et al., supra note 252; see Tom Snee, Long After ’80s Farm Crisis, Farm Workers
Still Take Own Lives at High Rate, IOWA NOW (June 12, 2017), https://now.uiowa.edu/2017
/06/long-after-80s-farm-crisis-farm-workers-still-take-own-lives-high-rate [https://perma
.cc/9R8N-6RT4].
266 Chuck Jones, Amid Trump Tariffs, Farm Bankruptcies and Suicides Rise, FORBES
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2019/08/30/amid-trump-tariffs
-farm-bankruptcies-and-suicides-rise/#6c634af72bc8 [https://perma.cc/9SPZ-TLG9]. Over
one thousand individuals called the crisis hotline in 2018 alone. Wedell et al., supra note 252.
267 OFF. OF PLAN.,DEP’T OF BUS.ECON.DEV.&TOURISM,INCREASED FOODSECURITY &FOOD
SELF-SUFFICIENCY STRATEGY ii (2012) [hereinafter INCREASED FOOD SECURITY], http://
files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/op/spb/INCREASED_FOOD_SECURITY_AND_FOOD_SELF_SUF
FICIENCY_STRATEGY.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS67-GFS2]; see also Todd Woody, Food Inde-
pendence Could Be a Matter of Survival for the U.S.’ Most Isolated State, TAKEPART(June 29,
2015), http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/06/29/hawaii-local-food [https://perma.cc
/AN98-QDBD]; George Kent, Food Security in Hawai‘i, in FOOD AND POWER IN HAWAI‘I:
VISIONS OF FOOD DEMOCRACY 28–45 (Aya Hirata Kimura & Krisnawati Suryanata eds.,
2016), http://www2.hawaii.edu/~kent/FOODSECURITYINHAWAII.pdf [https://perma
.cc/HB77-J9UE] (discussing food security in Hawai‘i with a historical perspective).
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to four days of food on-island if the ships and airplanes stop coming.268 This
precarious situation is repeated again and again across the country.269
Municipalities are not doing enough to prepare for food supply chain
disruptions. One recent study of Los Angeles, Madison, New Orleans,
New York City, and Portland reported that although many U.S. cities are
prioritizing “resilience planning” in response to natural disasters, those
plans often overlook food systems.270 Another report focusing on Balti-
more City concluded that “local food production and processing [were] not
sufficient to supply adequate food” and observed that “few U.S. cities
have considered food systems in disaster preparedness or resilience plan-
ning.”271 The City of Boston’s Food System Resilience Study following
Hurricane Sandy concluded that “metro food systems that are disrupted by
disasters may not return to normal operations for an inordinate amount
of time if they are not resilient, which could cause significant food avail-
ability and food access issues.”272 Urban agriculture in Boston represents
a small share of local food supply, and the report notes “significant in-
terest in Boston to expand local food production and processing in the city
and New England,” with community groups advocating for “50 percent
The State of Hawai‘i did not always import such a significant percentage of its food.
There was a marked decline in food sufficiency on the islands beginning in the 1970s. See
INCREASED FOOD SECURITY, supra note 267, at ii. One significant contributing factor was
interstate competition, aided by court rulings striking down as unconstitutional protective
laws passed by the Hawai‘i legislature. See Woody, supra note 267. Hawai‘i’s dairy industry,
for instance, at one point supplied nearly all of Hawai‘i’s milk, but by 2010, most dairy farms
were out of business following a federal court order striking down protective legislation.
See id.; see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Bd. of Agric., 590 F. Supp. 778, 786 (D. Haw. 1984) (ruling
the Hawaii Milk Control Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 157-24(a) (1976), which restricted sale of milk
traveling interstate, violated the Commerce Clause).
268 See Woody, supra note 267; see also MANA SOUTHICHACK, HAW. DEP’T OF AGRIC., IN-
SHIPMENT TREND AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON HAWAII’S FOOD SECURITY 24 (2007), https://ko
halacenter.org/pdf/HDOA_hawaii_food_security.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5VU-576K].
269 Researchers out of the University of Illinois analyzed the “food flows” between counties
in the United States, noting a high reliance on out-of-state food. See Lin et al., supra note
245, at 14.
270 KIMBERLY ZEULI &AUSTIN NIJHUIS, ICIC, THE RESILIENCE OF AMERICA’S URBAN FOOD
SYSTEMS: EVIDENCE FROM FIVE CITIES 4 (2017), https://icic.org/wp-content/uploads/2017
/01/ROCK_Resilient_Food_f2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5QE-9EX3].
271 Erin Biehl et al., Planning for a Resilient Urban Food System: A Case Study from
Baltimore City, Maryland, 8 (Suppl. 2) J. AGRIC., FOOD SYS. & CMTY. DEV. 39, 39, 50 (2018),
https://www.foodsystemsjournal.org/index.php/fsj/article/view/628 [https://perma.cc/F4
DF-Y4G9].
272 ICIC, RESILIENT FOOD SYSTEMS, RESILIENT CITIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CITY
OFBOSTON3(2015),https://icic.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICIC_Food_Systems_final
_revised_post.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SKW-9WT6].
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of the food consumed in New England [to] be produced in New England
by 2060.”273
Resiliency studies report vulnerabilities:
[F]ood from the point of production to the point of consumer
purchase is a vast and complex system that relies on
numerous agents, a range of distribution methods, and
various distribution points. As food travels from numerous
farms to a limited number of processing and packaging
points and then back out to a vast number of retail out-
lets, it is at risk of being caught in many potential “choke
points.”274
Resiliency planning is hampered by a lack of information, and a compar-
ative study of San Francisco, New York City, and Boston was frustrated by
“insufficient data on the origination of food products,” with the lack of
information on the amount and origin of food for the cities itself “creat[ing]
vulnerability.”275 Recognizing the need for comprehensive planning to
address inadequate food resources in communities, the USDA provides
research support for community food security assessments.276
Risks associated with long supply chains are not limited to large-
scale environmental or socio-economic disasters. Even without a pan-
demic or economic recession, approximately eleven percent of households
in the United States are what is described as “food insecure,”277 which the
USDA defines as “a household-level economic and social condition of
limited or uncertain access to adequate food.”278 For the year 2018, that
273 Id. at 11.
274 Id. at 5 (internal reference omitted).
275 Id. at 4–5.
276 See BARBARA COHEN, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV., COMMUNITY FOOD SECURITY ASSESS-
MENT TOOLKIT (2002), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43164/15824_efan
02013_1_.pdf?v=3612.7 [https://perma.cc/4C4T-PXXK].
277 ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL.,USDAECON.RSCH.SERV.,HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY
IN THE UNITEDSTATES IN 2018 v (2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/94
849/err-270.pdf?v=963.1 [https://perma.cc/P52Z-9QHA]. The prevalence of food security
was higher than the national average in Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia. Id.
at 19. The states with food insecurity rates lower than the national average were California,
Colorado, Hawai‘i, Iowa, Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
278 USDAECON.RSCH.SERV.,DEFINITIONS OF FOODSECURITY 2(2019),https://www.ers.us
da.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/definitions-of-food-security
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meant over 37 million people were food insecure at one point during the
year.279 And an estimated 13.5 million people in the United States live in
what is described as a “food desert,” where at least thirty-three percent
of the population lives more than one mile away from a supermarket in
the case of an urban area or ten miles away in the case of rural areas.280
With increasing concentration of delivery to large supermarket
chains, and the rise of packaging and distribution centers that are hun-
dreds of miles away from both the farms and the end consumer, it may
be economically infeasible for a supermarket to set up in a small town or
impoverished area.281 The result is no fresh food to be found, unless there
are community gardens. Atlanta, Detroit, the Bronx in New York, Chicago,
San Francisco, Camden, New Orleans, Minneapolis and St. Paul, Memphis,
and Seattle are reported to be the largest food deserts in the United
States as of 2019.282 These cities show that the risks associated with long
food supply chains are real, not theoretical.
Unsurprisingly, given the increasingly connected global food supply
chain, these concerns are not limited to farmers in the United States.
The 2013 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report
concluded that “[t]he fundamental transformation of agriculture may well
turn out to be one of the biggest challenges, including for international
security, of the 21st century.”283 Farmers around the world now find
.aspx [https://perma.cc/4T8D-BN36]; see also CHRISTIANA.GREGORY &ALISHACOLEMAN-
JENSEN, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV., FOOD INSECURITY, CHRONIC DISEASE, AND HEALTH
AMONGWORKING-AGEADULTS (2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/84
467/err-235.pdf?v=42942 [https://perma.cc/B3ZW-RB96] (documenting “the strong correlation
between food security status and chronic health conditions among working-age adults).
279 COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., supra note 277, at 9; see Reiley, supra note 241.
280 MICHELE VER PLOEG ET AL., USDAECON. RSCH. SERV., MAPPING FOOD DESERTS IN THE
UNITEDSTATES1(2011),https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2011/december/data-fea
ture-mapping-food-deserts-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/Y4C3-DYQG].
281 See USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV., ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE AND NUTRITIOUS FOOD: MEA-
SURING AND UNDERSTANDING FOOD DESERTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2009), https://
www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/42711/12716_ap036_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc
/VT5G-8G42].
282 Ann Casano, Here are All of the US’s Largest Food Deserts, RANKER (July 19, 2020),
https://www.ranker.com/list/largest-food-deserts-in-united-states/anncasano [https://perma
.cc/2LRL-M7RL].
283 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 231, at i; see also H.E. Tijjani Muhammad
Bande, President of the 74th Session of the United Nations Gen. Assembly, The Impact of
Covid-19 on Global Food Security and Nutrition: Preventing a Health Crisis from Becoming
a Food Crisis (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.un.org/pga/74/2020/04/17/the-impact-of-covid-19
-on-global-food-security-and-nutrition-preventing-a-health-crisis-from-becoming-a-food-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/BXW2-J39M] (regarding the impact of COVID-19 on global food security).
2021] U.S. PROPERTY LAW: A REVISED VIEW 373
themselves in the perverse position of selling food for export and then in
turn going hungry because they do not make enough money to purchase
food or end up purchasing lower quality food than what they grow.284
Countries are increasingly recognizing that the current agricultural sys-
tems result in food insecurity and all the risks that come along with it—
violent conflict, poverty, hunger, and displacement.285
In sum, the food system is not working for many farmers, places
at risk those communities that lack reliable access to fresh, nutritious
food, and impedes the public interest in food security. This is a complex
issue, one critical aspect of which is the fragmented approach to agricul-
tural land that treats it as a commodity to be used and sold by individu-
als or private corporations without recognition of the broader public and
community interest in that land.286 The old view represented by the
bundle of sticks metaphor reinforces this detrimental approach by en-
couraging a narrow focus on individual rights to the exclusion of broader
land use and food security concerns.
Yet history teaches us that local food sourcing is (and always has
been) an essential part to overall food—and national—security. The re-
newed interest today in home gardens to supplement decreased access
to grocery stores during the COVID-19 pandemic is reminiscent of the
“victory gardens” planted by communities during World Wars I and II,
when the country’s larger infrastructure was put to uses other than food
delivery.287 Those localized efforts were widely successful at the time.288
284 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 231, at 10, 288.
285 See generally FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN THE WORLDS
(2019), http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition [https://perma.cc/C9FC-QK6N]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (describing interaction between food security, conflict, eco-
nomic slowdowns, and social marginalization); Charles Martin-Shields & Wolfgang
Stojetz,Food Security and Conflict(FAO Agric. Dev. Econ. Working Paper No. 18s-04, 2018),
http://www.fao.org/3/CA1587EN/ca1587en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K4K-PVDS] (describing
“increased focus on the role of food security in conflict processes, both in the academic
and policy and communities”).
286 See supra discussion at Section I.B.
287 See Tejal Rao, Food Supply Anxiety Brings Back Victory Gardens, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 25,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/dining/victory-gardens-coronavirus.html [https://
perma.cc/K4PT-PLNB].
During WW II, women in particular were encouraged to assist the national food
production effort—those involved in the effort were referred to as the Women’s Land Army.
See Judy Barrett Litoff & David C. Smith, “To the Rescue of the Crops”: The Women’s Land
Army During World War II, 25 PROLOGUE (Winter 1993), https://www.archives.gov/publi
cations/prologue/1993/winter/landarmy.html [https://perma.cc/3648-RHWS].
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Why not now advance “resiliency gardens” or, better yet, “resilient agri-
culture” as part of a concerted effort toward a secure agricultural system?
In the United Kingdom—where, lest we forget, much of the prop-
erty law system here in the United States originated—there is growing
understanding of the need for change in its agricultural and food supply
system.289 Agricultural bills introduced to Parliament recognize that food
self-sufficiency in the United Kingdom has been on the decline for the
past thirty years and propose new requirements on the government to
report on food security to Parliament.290 The government called for a year-
long study, to develop an “integrated National Food Strategy.”291 Mean-
while, urban garden projects such as the “Incredible Edible” have sprung
up organically by the hundreds across the United Kingdom, with a focus
on resiliency and self-sufficiency at the community level.292 The situation
in the United States warrants a similar concerted and purposeful effort.
The revised view of property law described here is broad enough
to address the issues discussed above, including local and regional food
sourcing, vulnerable supply chains, resiliency planning, and the financial
struggles of small- and mid-size farms.293 It does not focus narrowly on
the individual right in arable land to the exclusion of those other consid-
erations. Any one of the property regimes reflecting the revised view can
help account for the proportion of individual-community-public interests
in agricultural land: whether by collective title, citizen shareholder
corporation, land trust, zoning, or easements, these property regimes can
achieve food security by expressly dedicating a certain amount of food to
feeding the region rather than to export.294 Real property regimes that
dedicate a certain amount of food to feeding the region rather than sale
on the commodities market, for instance, will ensure some arable land
289 Sam Knight, Can Farming Make Space for Nature?, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/02/17/can-farming-make-space-for-nature
[https://perma.cc/L22U-9SJJ] (discussing the need for functioning ecosystems to feed a
growing population).
290 Jonathan Finlay & Matthew Ward, House of Commons Library, Food Security: What
Is It and How Is It Measured? (Feb. 7, 2020), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/science
/environment/food-security-what-is-it-and-how-is-it-measured/ [https://perma.cc/8AN5-6B2U].
291 Id.; NAT’LFOODSTRATEGY, https://www.nationalfoodstrategy.org/ [https://perma.cc/E3
KK-EVTD] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020); see also UK DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFS.,
DEVELOPING A NATIONAL FOOD STRATEGY (2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/publi
cations/developing-a-national-food-strategy-independent-review-2019 [https://perma.cc
/CL5N-XZHV].
292 INCREDIBLE EDIBLE NETWORK, https://www.incredibleedible.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc
/LJP8-7BTE] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
293 See supra Part II.
294 See supra Section II.C.
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is dedicated to providing a stable source of food for the community rather
than to growing exclusively cash crops. In times of crisis and supply
chain disruptions, those farms which already dedicated a portion of their
crops to local distribution would more easily pivot to expand local supply to
meet the needs of the community. The revised view benefits the farmers
too. Farmers would not be solely reliant on the capricious commodities
market or long supply chains for their livelihood, and property regimes
that spread risk, such as collective title, may offset some of the financial
and emotional stressors experienced by farmers under the current system
that has led to declining participation in the farming profession.295
Questions to be pursued in future work relate to the level of
governmental authority or approval necessary to sustain these property
regimes. Food security implicates intriguing questions about federalism,
interstate commerce, and the power municipal or county governments
have to set agricultural land laws and policies. While local governing
entities have a direct interest in ensuring adequate food supply for their
residents, there are larger concerns about statewide resources, regional
watersheds, and other externalities at a national scale.
Food security is important locally and nationally, so individual
interests in land must be considered alongside, not to the exclusion of,
the public and community interests in relation to the food supply, popu-
lation distribution, and the needs of the surrounding community. Con-
ceptualizing individual rights as just one interconnected component of
the individual-community-public interests in land, represented by slices
of pie rather than the bundle of sticks,296 is a vital step toward counter-
acting the fragmented conception of rights in agricultural land to achieve
food security. Without the bottom and top layers, after all, there is no pie
at all.
CONCLUSION
The outmoded bundle of sticks—and the narrow focus on individ-
ual property interests it fosters—limits the evolution of property law,
hurts communities, and endangers the nation’s food security. Instead of
the hypothetical tragedy of the commons, the true risk is the “‘tragedy
of fragmentation,’ whereby the hyper-individualization of land steward-
ship leads to an inability to achieve any social planning in land use.”297
295 See id.
296 See supra Section II.B.
297 Kroncke, supra note 32, at 459 (quoting ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE:
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Food system vulnerabilities are emblematic of the conventional
view’s failure to account for the proportional interests in land. The Dust
Bowl and Great Depression prompted an overhaul in the national agricul-
tural system.298 With the vulnerability in America’s food supply exposed
once again by catastrophe, now is the time to rethink our food system
and, as a fundamental part of that, the property law that enables it.
This revised view of property law reflects the proportionality of
individual, community, and public interests coexisting in property and
gives rise to property regimes that encompass these complex relation-
ships. Property law must move finally and definitively away from the
simplistic individualism of Blackstonian property theory. In this way,
property law will continue to evolve to meet the challenges of the twenty-
first century. The bundle of sticks is destined for the woodchipper.
at 145 (“[P]rivate property may often lead to a scenario of over-fragmentation of rights,
in which every one of the multiple owners has a right to exclude others from a resource
such that no one has an effective privilege of use.”).
298 See, e.g., Paul M. Sparrow, FDR and the Dust Bowl, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://fdr.blogs.archives.gov/2018/06/20/fdr-and-the
-dust-bowl/ [https://perma.cc/9W57-JCTN] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
